2. Method

I said above (at the close of the introduction) that between the epoch of Marx and Engels and the epoch of Lenin came the epoch when the opportunism of the Second International held unrestricted sway. It is desirable to explain that, whilst opportunism was in actual fact dominant, the dominance was veiled. Formally, the Second International was led by such “orthodox “Marxists as Kautsky. In reality, the substance of its work was opportunist. The opportunists, being adaptable in virtue of their petty-bourgeois temperament, adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie. The “orthodox” Marxists, in their turn, adapted themselves to the opportunists, doing this “for the sake of unity”, “for the sake of peace within the Party”. Thus the policy of the “orthodox” Marxists was towed along in the wake of bourgeois policy. Opportunism ruled the roast.

This was during what may be called a pre-war phase, during a period when the development of capitalism was comparatively peaceful. The disastrous contradictions of imperialism had not yet become fully manifest; the industrial struggle, and trade-union development, were taking a more or less “normal” course; at the polls and in parliament, socialist and labour parties were winning “all along the line”; paeans were being sung in honour of constitutional methods of struggle, which (it was asserted) would amply suffice to effect the overthrow of capitalism. In short, the parties enrolled in the Second International were putting on fat, were becoming stodgy. Their leaders had ceased to think seriously about revolution, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the revolutionary education of the masses.

Unified revolutionary theory had given place to a bundle of contradictory propositions and fragments of theory unrelated to the actual revolutionary struggle of the masses; had given place to superannuated dogma. To outward seeming, the leaders (in continental countries) conformed to Marxist doctrine, but they deprived Marxism of its revolutionary core.

There was no longer a revolutionary policy. The “moderates “were in control, “safe and sane “labour leaders, diplomatic parliamentarians, champions of “statesmanlike “coalitions. For window dressing, “revolutionary “resolutions would be passed at congresses, and “revolutionary “slogans would be voiced from time to time—to be shelved with commendable promptitude.

The parties made no attempt to educate themselves, to work out a sound revolutionary tactic from the study of their own mistakes. Thorny problems were carefully avoided, as far as any serious attempt to solve them was concerned. Here, again, for window dressing, they would occasionally be brought up for discussion, but were always, in the end, evaded by means of some elastic resolution.

Such was the aspect of the Second International; such was its method of work; such was its armoury.

But a new epoch began, an epoch of imperialist wars, of revolutionary proletarian struggles. The old weapons were powerless in face of the omnipotence of financial capital.

All the activities of the Second International had to be reconsidered; its methods revised. An end had to be made of its triviality, its narrowness, its compromises, its renegade spirit, its alternations of jingoism and pacifism under a socialist mask, There was urgent need for an overhaul of the armoury of the Second International, rejecting all the weapons that were rusty and out-of-date, and forging new ones. Without this preliminary work, it would have been futile to enter upon a war against capitalism, for the proletariat would have been likely, in the coming revolutionary struggles, to find itself inadequately equipped or even quite weaponless.

To Leninism was assigned the task of undertaking this general inspection, this cleaning of the Augean stables of the Second International.

It was in such a situation that the method of Leninism was born and bred.

What are the demands made by this method?

First of all, there must be a testing of the dogmas of the Second International in the fire of the revolutionary mass struggle, in the fire of living practice. This means that the unity between theory and practice must be restored, that the breach between theory and practice must be bridged over, for thus only can there be created a genuine proletarian party, equipped with a revolutionary theory.

Secondly, there must be a testing of the policy of the parties affiliated to the Second International—not by their slogans and resolutions (which must not be accepted at face value), but by their deeds, for only by deeds can the confidence of the proletarian masses be won.

Thirdly, there must be a reorganisation of all the activities of proletarian parties. Their activities must be given the new revolutionary trend. The masses must be educated and prepared for the coming revolutionary struggle, for the proletarian revolution.

Fourthly, the proletarian parties must undertake self-criticism. They must learn by the experience of their own mistakes. Thus only can trustworthy troops and leaders be formed.

Such are the foundations, such is the essence, of the Leninist method.

How has this method been applied

- The opportunists of the Second International have a number of theoretical dogmas which they have learned by rote, which they repeat mechanically like a parrot. Let us consider some of them.

Dogma number one relates to the conditions under which the proletariat can seize power. The opportunists declare that the proletariat cannot seize power, and must not try to do so, unless it comprises a majority of the inhabitants of the country. They offer no proof of this assertion, which is in fact an absurd one, devoid of either theoretical or practical justification. “Let us admit it for the sake of argument,” says Lenin (substantially) to the gentlemen of the Second International. “But let us suppose that a situation arises—that there is a war, for instance, or an agrarian crisis—in the course of which the proletariat, though a minority of the population, is able to group round itself the immense majority of the toiling masses. Why, in that case, should not the proletariat seize power? Why should it not take advantage of the favourable internal and international situation to break the capitalist front and hasten the general settlement of accounts? Did not Marx say in the fifties of the nineteenth century that the proletarian revolution in Germany would be in a “splendid” position if it could but be supported by a sort of ‘second edition of the Peasants’ War’? But at that period the proportion of proletarians in Germany was considerably smaller than the proportion of proletarians in Russia at the time of the 1917 revolution.” Has not the practical experience of the Russian proletarian revolution taught us that this dogma, so dear to the heroes of the Second International, has no vital significance for the proletariat? Is it not obvious that the realities of the revolutionary mass struggle are daily refuting this outworn dogma?

Dogma number two runs as follows: The proletariat will not be able to keep power in its hands unless it has at its disposal a large number of intellectuals and technicians, sufficient to carry on the public services. A supply of these must first be assured under capitalist conditions, and only then should power be seized. “Suppose that the first part of what you say is true,” answers Lenin. “But why can’t we arrange matters in this way? Let’s seize power first, thus establishing conditions favourable to the development of the proletariat. Then we’ll put on our seven-league boots to stride forward in the work of raising the cultural level of the masses and training from among them the intellectuals and technicians we need.” Has not Russian experience taught us that the development of leaders from among the ranks of the workers goes on a hundred times quicker under the rule of the proletariat than under the rule of the capitalists? Does not the practical work of the revolutionary mass struggle dispose of the second opportunist dogma quite as effectually as the first?

Dogma number three: The general strike on behalf of political ends is inadmissible as part of proletarian tactic. From the theoretical standpoint, it is open to serious objections (see Engels’ criticism). In practice, it is dangerous, for it is likely to disturb the normal course of the economic life of the country and to empty the coffers of the trade unions. The general strike cannot take the place of the parliamentary struggle, which is the most important form of proletarian class struggle. “Well and good,” answer the Leninists. “But we have to remind you that Engels’ criticism related, not to the general strike per se, but to the purely industrial or economic strike advocated by the anarchists, who looked upon it as a substitute for the political struggle of the proletariat. This criticism has no bearing upon the general strike for political ends. Furthermore, who has proved, and where, that the parliamentary struggle is the most important form of proletarian class struggle? Does not the history of the revolutionary movement show beyond dispute that the parliamentary struggle can be nothing more than a school for, and an accessory means to, the extra-parliamentary struggle of the proletariat; that under capitalism the basic problems of the working-class movement are decided by force, by the direct action of the proletarian masses—by a general strike or by an insurrection? In the third place, why introduce talk about substituting the method of the general strike for political ends, for the method of the parliamentary struggle? Where and when did the advocates of the general strike for political purposes propose any such substitution? Fourthly, has not the history of the Russian revolution shown that the general strike for political purposes is an admirable training school for the proletarian revolution, and an invaluable means for mobilising and organising the proletarian masses on the eve of the attempt to storm the capitalist fortress? Why, then, in this connexion, introduce petty-bourgeois plaints concerning the disorganisation of economic life and the depletion of trade-union funds? Is it not plain that the practical experience of the revolutionary struggle refutes this opportunist dogma as well as the others?”

That is why Lenin said that “the revolutionary theory is not a dogma”, and that “it acquires its definitive formulation only in direct contact with the practical activity of the masses and with an actual revolutionary movement” (Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder); for theory must serve practice, “theory must answer the questions that arise out of practice” (The Friends of the People), and it must be confirmed by the data of practice.

As regards the political slogans and the political decisions of the parties affiliated to the Second International, it will suffice to recall the history of the slogan “War against War”. That will serve to remind you how double-faced these parties were, how base their policy, how skilful they were in veiling their antirevolutionary trend behind revolutionary watchwords and resolutions. Every one will remember the formidable demonstration made by the Second International at the Basle Congress when the imperialists were threatened with all the terrors of an armed rising in the event of war. It was at Basle that the dread slogan “War against War” was issued. But who has forgotten what happened shortly afterwards? Immediately the war really began, the Basle resolution was shelved, and the workers were given a new watchword—were told to exterminate one another for the greater glory of their respective capitalist countries. Is it not plain that revolutionary slogans and resolutions are not worth a brass farthing unless translated into action? Enough to compare the Leninist policy of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war, with the treacherous policy of the Second International when the imperialist war began; this shows us how base a thing is opportunism, how great is Leninism. I cannot refrain from quoting here a passage from Lenin’s book The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade, in which he scourges Kautsky for judging parties not by their deeds but by their words:

Kautsky adopts a typical petty-bourgeois attitude when he expresses the opinion that the mere utterance of a slogan makes a difference. The history of bourgeois democracy pricks this bubble. Bourgeois democrats have voiced, and continue to voice, all possible slogans, this being one of the ways in which they humbug the people. The vital matter is that we should test the sincerity of those who utter slogans, should compare their deeds with their words, that we should not be content with idealist and cheap-jack phraseology, but should find how much actual class content lies behind the words. (Works, Russian edition, vol. XV., P. 493.)

I shall allude only in passing to some of the other characteristics of the parties affiliated to the Second International: their dread of self-criticism; their way of trying to hide their blunders, and to gloss over thorny problems; their fondness for window dressing as a pretence that everything in the interior is in the best possible order, thus stifling healthy thought and hindering the revolutionary education of their members. Lenin pilloried this incapacity for self-criticism in his Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, writing with mordant sarcasm:

The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the surest tests of its seriousness, and of its ability to fulfil its duties towards its class and towards the labouring masses. Frank admission of an error, discovery of its causes, analysis of the situation in which it occurred, careful study of the ways by which the mistake can be remedied—these are the signs whereby a serious party can be recognised. That is fulfilment of duty. That is the education of the class and of the masses. (Works, Russian edition, vol. xvii., p. 147.)

Many people declare that self-criticism is dangerous to a party, that by a frank admission of its errors a proletarian party will put weapons into the hands of the enemies of the proletariat. In Lenin’s view, no weight can be attached to this objection. Here is what he said about the matter in One Step Forward. The words were penned in 1904, when our Party was still weak and insignificant.

Our adversaries, the enemies of the Marxists, are overjoyed at our dissensions. They will naturally make the most of certain passages in my pamphlet where I refer to the mistakes and shortcomings of our Party, and will try to exploit these admissions for their own purposes. The Russian Marxists have been in the firing line so long that they will disregard such pinpricks. They will, in spite of them, go on with the work of self-criticism. They will continue, unsparingly, to expose their own weaknesses, which will inevitably disappear as the working-class movement gathers strength. (Works, Russian edition, vol. v., p. 307.)

Such are the general characteristics of Leninist method.

Substantially, the elements of Lenin’s method are to be found already in Marxist doctrine, which is (to quote Marx’s own words) “in essence, critical and revolutionary”. This critical and revolutionary spirit permeates Lenin’s method from start to finish. But it would be a mistake to suppose that Lenin’s method is nothing more than a revival of that of Marx. It is not a mere revival; it is a practical application and an extension of Marx’s critical and revolutionary method, of Marx’s materialist dialectics.