II.3.2. Actuality

The Absolute is the unity of Inner and Outer as first unity, which is in itself. The Exposition appeared as external Reflection which has the immediate on its side as something found contingently, but at the same time is the movement of this towards, and its relation to, the Absolute, and as such leads it back to the Absolute and determines it as a mere way and manner. This way and manner, however, is the determination of the Absolute itself, namely its first identity or its unity which merely is in itself. And this Reflection not only posits that first Being-in-Self as essenceless determination, but, since it is negative self-relation, this Modus arises through it alone. This Reflection, as cancelling itself in its determinations, and, generally, as self-returning movement, is alone veritably absolute identity; and, at the same time, it is the determining of the Absolute or its modality. Consequently the Modus is the externality of the Absolute, but is this only as its intro-Reflection;—or it is the Absolute’s own manifestation, so that this manifesting is its intro-Reflection and therefore its Being-in-and-for-Self.

The Absolute taken as manifestation in this manner, in which it is nothing else and has no content except that of being self-manifestation, is Absolute Form. Actuality must be taken as this reflected absoluteness. Being is not yet actual: it is the first immediacy; consequently its Reflection is Becoming and transition into other; in other words its immediacy is not Being-in-and-for-Self. Actuality also stands higher than Existence. Existence is, indeed, immediacy which has arisen out of Ground and Conditions, or out of Essence and its Reflection. It therefore is in itself what Actuality is, namely real Reflection; but it is not yet the posited unity of Reflection and immediacy. Hence Existence passes over into Appearance, since it develops the Reflection which it contains. It is Ground which has perished; its determination is the restoration of this Ground; it thus becomes Essential Relation, and its last Reflection is this, that its immediacy is posited as intro-Reflection, and conversely. Now this unity, where Existence or immediacy, and Being-in-Self, Ground, or the reflected entity, are simply moments, is Actuality. For this reason the Actual is Manifestation; its externality does not draw it into the sphere of change; it is not its own Showing in an Other, but it manifests itself; that is, in its externality it is itself, and is itself in that alone, or only as self-distinguishing and determining movement.

Now Actuality is this absolute form, and in it, as such, the moments are only as transcended or formal and not yet realized; thus here its variety belongs to external Reflection and is not yet determined as content.

Actuality, as being, itself, immediate formal unity of Inner and Outer, is thus in the determination of immediacy as against the determination of intro-Reflection; or, it is an Actuality as against a Possibility. Their relation to each other is the third term—the Actual determined equally as intro-reflected Being and this at the same time as immediately existing. This third term is Necessity.

But at this point, Actual and Possible being formal distinctions, their relation too is only formal, and consists in this only, that the one as well as the other is a positedness,—that is, in Contingency.

Since, in Contingency, Actual as well as Possible is positedness, they have hereby obtained determination in themselves; thus, secondly, through this Real Actuality arises, and with it also emerge Real Possibility and Relative Necessity.

Thirdly, the intro-Reflection of Relative Necessity produces Absolute Necessity, which is Absolute Possibility and Actuality.

1. Actuality is formal in so far as, being first Actuality, it is only immediate, unreflected Actuality, and hence is only in this form-determination, but not as totality of form. Thus it is no more than a Being, or Existence in general. But essentially it is not mere immediate existence; it is as formal unity of Being-in-Self or internality and of externality, and therefore it immediately contains Being-in-Self or Possibility. What is actual is possible,

2. This Possibility is intro-reflected Actuality. But this very first reflectedness is likewise formality, and therefore, generally, only the determination of self-identity or of Being-in-Self in general.

But the determination here is totality of form, and consequently this Being-in-Self is determined as transcended or as essentially only in relation to Actuality, that is, as the negative of Actuality, it h posited as negative. Possibility therefore contains two moments. The first is the positive moment, that it is an intro-reflectedness. But in Absolute Form it is reduced to a moment, and thus intro-reflectedness no longer counts as Essence, but, secondly, has the negative meaning that Possibility is incomplete, refers on to an Other (namely Actuality), and perfects itself in it.

According to the first or merely positive side, then, Possibility is the mere form-determination of self-identity, or the form of essentiality. It is thus the relation-less and indeterminate container for everything in general.—In this sense of Formal Possibility, everything is possible which is not self-contradictory; hence the realm of Possibility is limitless multiplicity. But every manifold is determinate in itself and as against other, and contains negation; and, generally, indifferent variety passes over into opposition; but opposition is contradiction. Everything therefore equally is contradictory and therefore impossible.

—This merely formal predication of something—that it is possible—is as flat and empty as the law of contradiction and every content which is taken up into it. A is possible has as much significance as A is A. In so far as no steps are taken to develop the content, this content has the form of simplicity; difference arises in it only through the resolution of the content into its determinations. So long as this simple form is retained, the content remains self-identical and therefore possible. But this statement states nothing—just as in the formal law of identity.

The Possible, however, contains more than does the bare law of identity. The Possible is reflected intro-reflectedness, or the identical simply as moment of totality, and thus is also determined as not being in itself; it has therefore the second determination of being only a Possible—the Ought of the totality of form. Possibility without this Ought is essentiality as such; but Absolute Form contains this, that Essence itself is only moment and has no truth without Being. Possibility is this bare essentiality, posited in such a manner that it is only moment, and is not adequate to Absolute Form. It is Being-in-Self, determined as only posited, or, equally, as not being in itself.—Consequently Possibility in itself is also Contradiction or Impossibility.

This next expresses itself in this manner, that Possibility—as form-determination posited as transcended—possesses a content in general. As possible, this is a Being-in-Self, which at the same time is transcended or is an otherness. And because it thus is merely possible, an other, and its contrary, is equally possible. A is A; and, equally,—A is—A. Each of these propositions expresses the possibility of its content-determination. But as these two statements of identity they are indifferent to each other; it is not posited in the one that the other shall be added. Possibility is the comparing relation of both; in its determination as a Reflection of the totality it contains this, that the contrary too is possible. It is therefore the relating Ground of the connexion that, because A = A, therefore − A = − A. The possible A contains also the possible not-A; and it is this very relation which determines both as possible.

But the relation, as being one where in the one Possible its Other is contained, is a contradiction which cancels itself. According to its determination it is the Reflected, and, as was seen, the self-cancelling Reflected; and thus it is also the immediate, and becomes Actuality.

3. This Actuality is not first Actuality, but is reflected: it is posited as unity of itself and Possibility. The Actual as such is possible, and is in immediate positive identity with Possibility; but the latter has determined itself as only Possibility; and accordingly the Actual too is determined as only a Possible. And immediately because Possibility is immediately contained in Actuality, it is contained in Actuality as transcended, as only Possibility. Conversely Actuality which is in unity with Possibility is only transcended immediacy;—or, because Formal Actuality is only immediate and first Actuality, it is only moment, only transcended Actuality, or only Possibility.

Here at the same time there is a closer expression of the determination, how far Possibility is Actuality. For Possibility is not yet all Actuality,—no question has yet arisen of real and absolute Actuality;—it is only that Possibility which first occurred—Formal Possibility, which determined itself to be only Possibility; and thus it is Formal Actuality, which is only Being or Existence in general. Whatever is possible therefore has a Being or an Existence.

This unity of Possibility and Actuality is Contingency—The Contingent is an Actual which at the same time is determined only as possible—whose Other or opposite equally is. This Actuality therefore is mere Being or Existence, but is posited in its truth, as being equivalent to a positedness or to Possibility. Conversely Possibility as intro-Reflection or Being-in-Self is posited as positedness; in this sense of Actuality, what is possible is an Actual; it is worth only as much as contingent Actuality: it is itself a Contingent.

The Contingent therefore offers two sides. First, in so far as it immediately contains Possibility, or (which is the same thing) in so far as Possibility is in a transcended state in it, it is neither positedness nor is it mediated, but is immediate Actuality; it has no Ground.—This immediate Actuality belongs to the Possible too, and therefore it is determined equally as the Actual and as contingent, and thus is groundless as well.

But, secondly, the Contingent is the Actual as a merely Possible or as a positedness; and similarly the Possible as formal Being-in-Self is merely positedness. Thus neither is in and for itself, but each has its veritable intro-Reflection in an Other: or, it has a Ground.

The Contingent, then, has no Ground because it is contingent; and, equally, because it is contingent it has a Ground.

It is the posited and unmediated conversion of Inner and Outer, or of intro-reflectedness and Being, into each other,—posited, because Possibility and Actuality each has this determination in itself, since both are moments of Absolute Form.—Thus Actuality in its immediate unity with Possibility is only Existence, and is determined as groundless and as being only posited and only possible;—or, as reflected and determinate as against Possibility, it is severed from Possibility, from intro-reflectedness, and thus equally and immediately is only a Possible.—Similarly Possibility, as simple Being-in-Self, is an immediate having merely bare Being in general;—or, in opposition to Actuality, it is equally a non-actual Being-in-Self, it is only a Possible, and for this very reason is again only a nonintro-reflected Existence in general.

This absolute unrest of the Becoming of these two determinations is Contingency. But, since each immediately converts itself into its opposite, it simply coincides with itself in this its opposite; and this identity of both—of each with the other—is Necessity.

The Necessary is an Actual; it thus exists as immediate or groundless; but equally it has its Actuality through an Other, or in its Ground, but is at the same time the positedness of this Ground, and its intro-Reflection; the Possibility of the Necessary is a transcended Possibility. The Contingent therefore is necessary because the Actual is determined as Possible, whereby its immediacy is transcended and cast off into Ground (or Being-in-Self) and Grounded, and also because this its Possibility—the Ground-relation—is simply transcended and posited as Being. The Necessary is, and this existent is itself the Necessary. It is also in itself’, this intro-Reflection is an Other than that immediacy of Being, and the Necessity of the existent is an Other. Thus the existent itself is not the Necessary; but this Being-in-Self is itself only positedness; it is transcended and itself immediate. Thus Actuality in the term which is distinct from it, namely Possibility, is self-identical. As this identity it is Necessity.

1. The Necessity which has been reached is formal because its moments are formal; they are simple determinations which are a totality only as immediate unity or as immediate conversion of one into the other, and thus are without the form of independence.—Hence, in this Formal Necessity, the unity at first is simple and indifferent to its distinctions. As immediate unity of the form-determinations this Necessity is Actuality; but its unity now is determined as indifferent to the distinction between the form-determinations, that is, between itself and Possibility; and so this Actuality is one which has a content. This content, as indifferent identity, contains form too as indifferent, that is, as merely a variety of determinations, and is manifold content in general. This Actuality is Real Actuality.

At this point Real Actuality as such is the Thing of many properties, the existing world; but it is not the Existence which resolves itself into Appearance, but, as Actuality, it is also Being-in-Self and intro-Reflection; it preserves itself in the multiplicity of bare Existence; its externality is an internal attitude to itself alone. What is actual can act; and something manifests its actuality through that which it produces. Its attitude to other is the manifestation of itself; it is neither a transition—where the existent Something relates itself to other,—nor an appearing—where the Thing stands merely in a relation to others and, though independent, has its intro-Reflection and determinate essentiality in another independent entity.

Real Actuality likewise now immediately possesses Possibility. It contains the moment of Being-in-Self; but since as yet it is only immediate unity, it is in one of the determinations of form, and consequently is distinct, as the existent, from Being-in-Self or Possibility.

2. This Possibility, as the Being-in-Self of Real Actuality, is itself Real Possibility; and, at first, it is Being-in-Self which is full of content.—Formal Possibility is intro-Reflection only as the abstract identity in which a Something is not self-contradictory. But in so far as the determinations, circumstances, and conditions of a case are explored in order to deduce its possibility, Formal Possibility is left behind, and what is now under consideration is its Real Possibility.

This Real Possibility is itself immediate Existence, but no longer because Possibility as such, as formal moment, is immediately its opposite and a non-reflected Actuality; but, because it is Real Possibility, this determination forthwith belongs to it. Consequently the Real Possibility of a case is the existing multiplicity of circumstances which are related to it.

This multiplicity of existence then is, indeed, as much Possibility as Actuality, but as yet their identity is only the content, which is indifferent to these form-determinations; they therefore constitute form, determined as against their identity.—Or, immediate Real Actuality, because it is immediate, is determined as against its Possibility; and, as this determinate and therefore reflected Possibility, it is Real Possibility. Now this Possibility is the posited whole of form, but of form in its determinateness,—namely Actuality as formal or immediate Actuality and also Possibility as abstract Being-in-Self. Consequently this Actuality which constitutes the Possibility of a case is not its own Possibility, but the Being-in-Self of some other Actual; it in itself is that Actuality which is to be transcended, or Possibility as Possibility only.—Thus Real Possibility constitutes the totality of conditions; an Actuality which is not intro-reflected or scattered, but is determined to be Being-in-Self—the Being-in-Self of some Other, which ought to pass back into itself.

That therefore which is really possible is in its Being-in-Self a formal identity which in its simple content-determination is not self-contradictory; but, as self-identical, it must also not be contradictory in all its developed and distinct circumstances and in everything with which it is connected. But secondly, because it is manifold in itself and has manifold connexions with other, and because, further, variety of itself passes over into opposition, it is contradictory. If any possibility is under discussion and it is desired to demonstrate its contradiction, it is only necessary to concentrate upon the multiplicity which it contains as content or as its conditioned existence, and thence its contradiction is easily discovered.—But this is not a contradiction of comparison: manifold existence in itself is its own self-transcendence and destruction, and for this reason essentially implies within itself the determination of being merely possible.—When all the conditions of a fact are completely assembled, it enters into Actuality;—the completeness of the conditions is the totality as of content, and the fact itself is this content, determined to be both actual and possible. In the sphere of Conditioned Ground the conditions have form—namely, Ground or Reflection which is for itself—outside themselves; and this Ground or Reflection relates them for moments of the fact, and evokes existence in them. Here, on the other hand, immediate Actuality is not determined by a presupposing Reflection as being condition: it is posited that it itself is Possibility.

Now self-transcending Real Possibility contains a duality, which is transcended; for Possibility is itself a duality, since it is Actuality and Possibility, i. The Actuality is formal—an Existence which appeared as independent and immediate and by its transcendence becomes reflected Being or moment of an Other, and thus receives Being-in-Self. 2. This Existence was also determined as Possibility, or as the Being-in-Self, but of an Other. As it transcends itself, this Being-in-Self also is transcended and passes over into Actuality.—Thus this movement of self-transcending Real Possibility produces the same moments which are already there, but now each grows out of the other; consequently in this negation it is also not a transcendence but a coincidence with itself—In Formal Possibility, if and because something was possible, then also not itself but its Other was possible. Real Possibility is no longer faced with such an Other, for it is real in so far as it itself is also Actuality. Its immediate existence, then (that is, the ring of conditions), transcends itself, and it thus constitutes itself that Being-in-Self which it already is, namely as the Being-in-Self of an Other. Since conversely its moment of Being-in-Self at the same time hereby transcends itself, it becomes Actuality—that is, that moment which also it already is.—What vanishes thus is this, that Actuality was determined as the Possibility or Being-in-Self of an Other, and conversely Possibility as an Actuality which is not that of which it is the Possibility.

3. Thus the negation of Real Possibility is its self-identity; in this its transcendence it is the recoil of this transcendence into itself, and thus is Real Necessity.

What is necessary cannot be otherwise: what is possible in general, can; for Possibility is that Being-in-Self which is only positedness and therefore essentially otherness. Formal Possibility is this identity as transition into the utterly other: Real Possibility, since it possesses the other moment, Actuality, is already itself Necessity. What therefore is really possible can no longer be otherwise: under such and such conditions and circumstances something else cannot result. Real Possibility and Necessity are therefore only apparently different; this is an identity which does not become but is already presupposed and forms a basis. Consequently Real Necessity is a relation which is full of content; for the content is that self-existent identity which is indifferent to distinctions of form.

But this Necessity at the same time is relative.—For it has a presupposition from which it begins; it has its point of departure in the contingent. For the Real Actual as such is the determinate Actual, and, at first, has its determinateness as immediate Being in the fact that it is a multiplicity of existing circumstances. But, as this immediate Being as determinateness, it is also its own negative, it is Being-in-Self or Possibility; and thus it is Real Possibility. As this unity of the two moments it is the totality of form—a totality, however, which as yet is external to itself; it is unity of Possibility and Actuality in such a manner that (1) manifold Existence is Possibility immediately or positively—a Possible which is self-identical in general because it is an Actual; and (2) in so far as this Possibility of Existence is posited, it is determined as Possibility only, as immediate conversion of Actuality into its opposite,—or as Contingency. Hence this Possibility which immediate Actuality possesses in so far as it is condition, is only Being-in-Self as Possibility of an Other. It has been shown that this otherness transcends itself and that this positedness is itself posited, and hereby Real Possibility indeed becomes Necessity; but still, the latter thus begins from the former unity—which is not yet intro-reflected—of Possible and Actual;—as yet this presupposing and the self-returning movement are separate;—or, Necessity has not yet determined itself as Contingency out of itself.

In the content, the relativity of Real Necessity exhibits itself in such a manner that the content so far is only identity indifferent to form; it is therefore distinct from it and is a determinate content in general. The really Necessary is consequently any restricted Actuality, which for the sake of this restrictedness is also merely contingent in some other respect.

Thus in fact Real Necessity in itself is also Contingency.—This now appears in the following manner: the really Necessary is necessary indeed in form, but in content is restricted and has its Contingency through that. But Contingency is contained also in the form of Real Necessity; for, as was seen, Real Possibility is only in itself the Necessary, while it is posited as the otherness of Actuality and Possibility to each other. Real Necessity therefore contains Contingency; it is the return to self out of that restless otherness of Actuality and Possibility to each other, but not out of itself to itself.

In itself, then, the unity of Necessity and Contingency is found here; this unity must be called Absolute Actuality.

Real Necessity is determinate Necessity: Formal Necessity has not yet either content or determinateness. The determinateness of Necessity consists in this, that it possesses in itself its own negation, namely Contingency. This is the result about it which has been reached.

But this determinateness in its first simplicity is Actuality; consequently determinate Necessity is, immediately, actual Necessity. This Actuality, which itself is necessary as such (in that it contains Necessity as its Being-in-Self), is Absolute Actuality \—Actuality which no longer can be otherwise, for its Being-in-Self is not Possibility but Necessity itself.

But now this Actuality, because it is posited as absolute, that is, as being itself the unity of itself and Possibility, is only an empty determination, or, it is Contingency.—This emptiness of its determination makes it a mere Possibility, something which might equally well be otherwise and may be determined as Possible. But this Possibility itself is Absolute Possibility; for it is just this Possibility, of being determined equally as Possibility or as Actuality. Since it is this indifference to itself, it is posited as empty or contingent determination.

Thus Real Necessity not only in itself contains Contingency; Contingency also becomes in it; but this Becoming, as externality, is itself only the Being-in-Self of such Necessity, since this Becoming is only an immediate determinedness. But it is not only this, but also the very Becoming of Necessity,—or, the presupposition which the latter had is its own positing. For, as Real Necessity, it is the suspension of Actuality in Possibility, and conversely;—it is the simple conversion of one of these moments into the other, and thus it is also their simple positive unity, each—as was seen—coinciding in the other only with itself. But thus it is Actuality; of such a kind, however, that it is only as this simple self-coincidence of form. Hence its negative positing of these moments is itself the presupposing or positing of itself as transcended, or of immediacy.

But at this very point this Actuality is determined as something negative; it is a self-coincidence out of Actuality, which was Real Possibility; thus this new Actuality arises only out of its Being-in-Self, out of its own negation.—Hereby it is also immediately determined as Possibility, or as something mediated through its negation. But thus this Possibility is now immediately nothing but this mediating, in which Being-in-Self, or Possibility and immediacy, both in the same manner are positedness.—Thus it is Necessity which is equally transcending of this positedness or positing of immediacy and of Being-in-Self, and also by that very fact determining of this transcending as positedness. It therefore itself determines itself as Contingency,—repels itself from itself in its Being, in this repulsion has but returned to itself, and in this return (as its Being) has but repelled itself from itself.

Thus Form in its realization has penetrated all its distinctions; it has made itself transparent, and, as Absolute Necessity, is only this simple self-identity of Being in its negation, or in Essence.—The distinction between content and form itself has vanished equally; for this unity of Possibility in Actuality, and conversely, is form which is indifferent to itself in its determinateness, or in positedness; it is the fact filled with content, against which the form of Necessity broke and remained external. But in this manner it is this reflected identity of the two determinations as indifferent to them, and thus it is the form-determination of Being-in-Self as opposed to positedness; and this Possibility constitutes the restrictedness of the content which belonged to Real Necessity. But the dissolution of this distinction is Absolute Necessity, the content of which is this distinction which in it penetrates itself.

Absolute Necessity then is the truth into which Actuality and Possibility in general pass back, as well as Formal and Real Necessity.—The truth was reached that Absolute Necessity is Being which in its negation—in Essence—relates itself to itself and is Being. It is simple immediacy or pure Being as much as simple intro-Reflection or pure Essence: it is the fact of the identity of these two.—The absolutely Necessary is only because it is, and has otherwise neither condition nor Ground.—But equally it is pure Essence; its Being is simple intro-Reflection; it is, because it is. As Reflection it has Ground and condition, but it has for Ground and condition only itself. It is Being-in-Self, but its Being-in-Self is its immediacy; its Possibility is its Actuality.—It is, then, because it is; as coincidence of Being with itself it is Essence; but since this simpleness is also immediate simplicity, it is Being.

In this manner Absolute Necessity is the Reflection or Form of the Absolute, unity of Being and Essence, simple immediacy, which is absolute negativity. Consequently on the one hand its distinctions do not exist as Determinations of Reflection, but as existing multiplicity or differentiated Actuality, which has the shape of Others independent against one another. On the other hand, since its relation is absolute identity, it is the absolute conversion of its Actuality into its Possibility and of its Possibility into Actuality.—Absolute Necessity is therefore blind. On the one hand, the distinct terms which are determined as Actuality and Possibility have the shape of intro-Reflection as of Being; they therefore both exist as free Actualities, of which neither shows in the other nor will allow any trace of its relation to the other to appear in itself; being founded on itself each is the Necessary in itself. Necessity as Essence is locked up in this Being, and consequently the mutual contact of these Actualities appears as an empty externality; the Actuality of one in the other is bare Possibility or Contingency. For Being is posited as absolutely necessary, as self-mediation which is absolute negation of mediation by other, or as Being which is identical only with Being; consequently an Other having Actuality in Being is just determined as a bare Possible, as empty positedness.

But this Contingency is rather Absolute Necessity; it is the Essence of these free Actualities which are necessary in themselves. This Essence is that which shuns the light, because in these Actualities there is no Showing nor reflex, because they are founded purely on themselves, are fashioned only for themselves, and manifest only themselves,—because they are only Being.—Their Essence however will burst out in them, and reveal both what it is and what they are. The simplicity of their Being and repose upon themselves is absolute negativity; it is the freedom of their show-less immediacy. This negative element breaks out in them because Being through this its Essence is self-contradiction; it is this contradiction as against this Being in the form of Being, as the negation therefore of those Actualities, which is absolutely different from their Being, or as their Nothing, which is an otherness over against them as free as is their Being.—Yet its existence in them could not but be recognized. In their self-based fashioning they are indifferent to form; they are a content and, therefore, distinct Actualities and a determinate content; and this content is the mark which Necessity impressed upon them when it, which in its determination is absolute return upon itself, let them go free as absolutely actual. To this mark Necessity appeals as to the witness of its cause, and, touched by it, the Actualities now perish. This manifestation of that which determinateness is in truth—namely negative self-relation—is blind submersion in otherness; the Showing or Reflection which breaks out is, in the existent entities, as Becoming or transition of Being into Nothing. But conversely Being is equally Essence, and Becoming is Reflection or Showing. Thus externality is their internality; their relation is absolute identity; and the transition of Actual into Possible, of Being into Nothing, is a self-coincidence; Contingency is Absolute Necessity, and itself is the presupposing of that first Absolute Actuality.

This self-identity of Being in its negation is Substance. Substance is this unity as in its negation, or as in Contingency: it is thus Substance as self-relation. The blind transition of Necessity is rather the proper Exposition of the Absolute, its movement in itself which, in its alienation, rather exhibits itself.