I.1.2. Determinate Being

The determinateness of Determinate Being, as such, is existent determinateness, or Quality. By virtue of its quality Something is opposed to an Other: it is variable and finite, and determined not only as contrasted with but also simply as negative against, an Other. First, then, this its negation opposed to the finite Something is the Infinite: the abstract opposition in which these determinations appear resolves itself into an Infinity which contains no oppositions, into Being for Self.

The treatment of Determinate Being has therefore three divisions:

(A) Determinate Being as such.

(B) Something and Other: Finitude.

(C) Qualitative Infinity.

In Determinate Being (a) as such, its determinateness (b) as Quality, must first be distinguished. This, however, must be taken as well in the one determination of Determinate Being as in the other; as Reality as well as Negation. But equally in these determinatenesses Determinate Being is reflected into itself; and posited as such it is (c) Something, or that which Is Determinate.

Determinate Being issues from Becoming: it is the simple oneness of Being and Nothing. From this simplicity it derives its form as of something immediate. Becoming, which mediated it, is left behind; it has transcended itself, and Determinate Being therefore appears as something primary and as something from which a beginning is being made. First, then, it is one-sidedly determined as Being; the other determination which it contains, that of Nothing, will also develop itself in it, in opposition to this other.

It is not mere Being, but Determinate Being (Dasein), the etymology of which implies being at a certain place, though the spatial signification does not belong here. According to the manner of its Becoming, Determinate Being in general is Being together with a Not-being, so that this latter is taken up into simple unity with Being. Not-being taken up into Being in this manner, that the concrete whole is in the form of Being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such.

Since, in Becoming, Being has proved itself to be no more than a moment, the Whole also, in the form—that is, in the determinateness—of Being, is something transcended and negatively determined; but it is such for us when we reflect, it is not yet so posited in itself. But the determinateness as such of Determinate Being is the determinateness which is posited and also is implied in the expression “Determinate Being.”—The two must always be carefully distinguished: only that which is posited in a concept is proper to the contemplation which develops it, to its content. The determinateness, however, which is not yet posited in the concept is part of our reflection, whether it regards the nature of the concept itself, or is external comparison: if attention is drawn to a determinateness of the latter kind it can only serve to elucidate, or point the way of, the process which will clearly manifest itself in the course of development. It is an external reflection which holds that the whole, the unity of Being and Nothing, is contained in the one-sided determinateness of Being; but this reflection will actually be posited in the negation, in Something and an Other, and so forth.—Our aim here has been to draw attention to this difference; but, if we were to give an account of everything which reflection would presume to remark, we should fall into the prolixity of anticipating what must in any case result in the investigation. Such reflections may facilitate a general view and hence an understanding of the process; but they have this disadvantage, that they may be mistaken for mere unjustified assertions, grounds and foundations for the further development of the subject. We must therefore take them for no more than they are meant to be, distinguishing them from those terms which are moments in the development of the process itself.

Determinate Being corresponds to Being in the previous sphere; but, since Being is indeterminate, no determinations can be evolved in it. But Determinate Being is, as such, concrete; so that immediately various determinations and distinct relations of its moments disclose themselves in it

In Determinate Being, Being and Nothing are immediately one: they are therefore coextensive. In so far as Determinate Being is at all, in so far it is Not-being, and therefore determinate. Being is not the universal and determinateness not the particular. Determinateness has not yet severed itself from Being; and, indeed, it never will do so, for the truth which is now the basis is the unity of Being and Not-being; and all further determinations are based on this as their foundation. But the relation here existing between determinateness and Being is the immediate unity of both, so that as yet no distinctness between them is posited.

Determinateness, taken thus isolated and by itself as existent determinateness, is Quality,—something quite simple and immediate. Determinateness in general is that more universal something which may equally be the quantitative or something further determined. This simplicity makes it impossible to say anything further about Quality as such.

But Determinate Being, which contains Nothing as well as Being, is itself the measure of the one-sidedness of Quality as merely immediate or existent determinateness. It must equally be posited in the determination of Nothing; and then this immediate or existent determinateness is posited as one which is differentiated and reflected: Nothing, the determinate part of a determinateness, is equally reflected, is a negation. Quality which is to count as something separately existing is Reality; taken as infected with any negation, it becomes Negation in general, which also is a Quality (though it counts as a deficiency) and further determines itself as limit or barrier.

Each is a Determinate Being; but with Reality as Quality (with emphasis on the fact that it is) the fact is hidden that it contains determinateness and therefore negation; Reality therefore is taken as something positive from which negation, limitation, and deficiency are supposed to be excluded. Negation taken as mere deficiency would be equivalent to Nothing: in fact it is a Determinate Being, a Quality, but one which has for determination a Not-being.

Reality may seem to be an ambiguous word, since it is employed for different and even opposite determinations. In the philosophic sense, for instance, a merely empirical reality is spoken of as a worthless existence. On the other hand, if a thought, a concept, or a theory is said to have no reality, the meaning is that it has no actuality; while in itself or as a concept the idea, for instance, of a Platonic Republic might very well be true. The idea here is not denied its value, and it is allowed to remain by the side of the reality. But as opposed to “mere” ideas and “mere” concepts, the real is taken as the only truth.—If it is a one-sided sense in which external existence is taken as the criterion of the truth of a content, it is equally one-sided if the idea, the essence or internal feeling is imagined as indifferent to external existence or is even regarded as excellent in proportion as it is removed from Reality.

In dealing with the expression “Reality” we must make mention of the former metaphysical concept of God, which used especially to be made the basis of the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God. God was defined as the Sum-total of all Realities; and of this sum-total it was said that it contained no contradiction, none of the realities cancelling the other; for a reality was to be taken merely as something complete and affirmative, containing no negation. Thus the realities were neither opposed nor contradictory to one another.

This concept of Reality implies that it survives when every negation is thought away. But this removes every determinateness. Reality is Quality, or Determinate Being; it therefore contains the moment of negation: this alone makes it that determinate something which it is. Taken as infinite (in the ordinary meaning of the term), or in its so-called “eminent” sense (and this is what is demanded), it spreads out into indeterminateness and loses its meaning. The goodness of God is not to be goodness in the ordinary, but in the eminent, sense; it is not to be distinct from justice, but is to be tempered by it (this is a mediatory expression belonging to Leibniz); and contrariwise justice is to be tempered by goodness; and now goodness has ceased to be goodness, and justice, justice. Power is to be tempered by wisdom; but then it is no longer power as such, for it is subordinate to wisdom; wisdom is to be extended into power, but then it ceases to be that wisdom which determines end and means. The true concept of the infinite and its absolute unity, which will be discovered later, must not be taken as a tempering or mutual limitation or mingling; for as such it is a superficial relation held fast in an indeterminate mist, and satisfactory only to non-conceptual imagination.—Reality, as it is taken in this definition of God, as a determinate Quality, is driven beyond its determinateness and ceases to be Reality: it becomes abstract Being. God as the purely Real in all Reals, or as the Sum-total of all Realities, is that same indeterminate and nebulous something as the empty Absolute where everything is one.

If on the other hand Reality is taken in its determinateness, then, since it essentially contains the moment of negativeness, the Sum-total of all Realities equally becomes the sum-total of all negations and of all contradictions; it becomes, for instance, absolute power which holds absorbed everything determinate, but, since it exists only in so far as it has opposed to it something not yet subjected to it, any thought which extends it to perfected and unbounded power leads it back to abstract Nothing. This Real in all Reals, or Being in all Determinate Being, which is to express the concept of God, is nothing else than abstract Being, and identical with Nothing.

“Determinateness is negation posited affirmatively,” is the meaning of Spinoza’s omnis determinatio est negatio,—a proposition of infinite importance; only, negation as such is formless abstraction. Speculative philosophy must not be accused of making negation, or Nothing, its end: Nothing is the end of philosophy as little as Reality is the truth.

From the proposition that determinateness is negation it necessarily follows that there is One Substance only: the unity of Spinoza’s Substance. Spinoza was forced thus to unite Thought and Being (or Extension), the two determinations which were present to his mind; for, taken as determinate realities, they are negations, the infinite nature of which constitutes their unity; according to Spinoza’s definition (which will be further dealt with below), the infinity of anything is its affirmation. He therefore conceived of them as Attributes, that is, as such as, having no separate persistence or Being-in-and-for-self, exist only as transcended, or as moments; or, rather, they are not even moments, since Substance is that which in itself is quite indeterminate, the Attributes (as also the Modes) being distinctions made by an external Understanding.—Nor can the substantiality of individuals persist against this proposition. The individual is related to itself because it sets a limit to everything else: from this very fact the limits become limits of itself, relations to an other, and its existence no longer depends upon itself. It is true that the individual is more than a something limited in every direction; but this ’‘more” belongs to a different sphere of the concept; in the metaphysics of Being it is simply something determinate; and it is determinateness, essentially in its negative force, which opposes itself to the existence, as such and in and for itself, of such a something, such a finite thing, whirling it into the same negative movement of Understanding which causes everything to disappear in the abstract unity which is Substance.

Negation is immediately opposed to Reality; further on and in the proper sphere of reflected determinations it is opposed to the positive, which is Reality reflecting upon negation,—Reality in which the negative element, hidden in Reality as such, shows forth.

Quality is chiefly property in this respect, that it shows itself as an immanent determination in an external relation. By properties, for instance those of herbs, we mean determinations which not only are proper to a something, but the degree in which it preserves itself in relation to others in a peculiar manner by virtue of them, not allowing free course to alien activities posited in it, but on the contrary enforcing its own determinations in an Other, at the same time not keeping this external to itself. A more passive determinateness, such as figure or form, is not, on the other hand, called property nor even Quality, since it is imagined as variable and not identical with Being.

“Qualation” or “Inqualation”—an expression belonging to Jacob Böhme’s philosophy, a philosophy which goes deep but into a murky depth—means the movement of a quality (that of being sour, astringent, fiery, and so forth) in itself, in so far as it posits and confirms itself in its negative nature (its quale) as opposed to an other and is its own restlessness, so that it is only by means of a struggle that it produces and maintains itself.

In Determinate Being its determinateness was distinguished in the shape of Quality: in Quality, so far as it exists, there exists distinction—that between Reality and Negation. But, however much these distinctions may have a place in Determinate Being, they are equally void and transcended. Reality itself contains negation, it is Being Determinate, and not indeterminate nor abstract. And, equally. Negation is Determinate Being: it is not a Nothing which is supposed to be abstract, but it is here posited as it is in itself, as being and as belonging to Determinate Being. Thus Quality is in no way separated from Determinate Being, which is just this—a qualitative Being.

But this transcendence of the distinction is more than a mere retraction and external re-omission of it, more than a mere return to the simple beginning, Determinate Being as such. The distinction cannot be omitted, for it is. Therefore, the truth which we have, is, Determinate Being in general, distinction in it, and the transcendence of this distinction; Determinate Being is not merely undifferentiated, as at the beginning; it is once more identical with itself through the transcendence of the distinction, and the simple nature of Determinate Being is mediated through this transcendence. The fact of this transcendence of distinction is the peculiar determinateness of Determinate Being; it is Being-in-itself, that which is-determinate, or Something.

Something is the first negation of negation as simple existent self-relation. Determinate Being, living, thinking, and so on, determine themselves essentially as that which exists, lives, thinks (ego), and so on. This determination is of the utmost importance, as it saves us from stopping at Determinate Being, living, or thinking, and so on, or at Godhead (instead of God), as universals. Imagination rightly holds Something to be something real. But Something is still a very superficial determination; just as Reality and Negation, so Determinate Being and its determinateness, though not completely void like Being and Nothing, yet are quite abstract determinations. It is just for this reason that they are the commonest expressions; reflection untrained in philosophy most uses them, pours its distinctions into them, and imagines that now it has something really well and firmly determined.—The negative of the negative, as Something, is only the beginning of the subject; and the Being-in-self is quite indeterminate. It next determines itself as being-for-self and so on, till finally as Notion it receives the concrete intensity of the subject. The negative unity with self is the basis of all these determinations; though here the first negation (negation in general) must carefully be distinguished from the second, the negation of negation, which is concrete and absolute negativity, while the first is only abstract negativity.

Something, so far as it is, is because it is the negation of negation; for this is the restoration of simple self-reference; but, for this very reason, Something is equally self-mediation. Already in the simple form of Something, and, more definitely, in Being-for-Self, Subject, and so on, self-mediation is present; even in Becoming there is a quite abstract mediation: in Something the self-mediation is posited in so far as it is determined as a simple identity.—Attention may be drawn to the presence of mediation in general, as against the principle of the alleged mere immediacy of knowledge, from which all mediation is supposed to be excluded: but there is no further need to draw attention particularly to the moment of mediation, for it is to be found everywhere and in every concept.

This self-mediation, which Something in itself is, taken merely as negation of negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides: it therefore collapses into that simple unity which is Being. Something is, and therefore also is a Determinate Being; and, further, it also in itself is a Becoming, having, however, something more than Being and Nothing for moments. One of these, Being, has now become Determinate Being, and, further, a Determinate Being. The second also is a Determinate Being, but one determined as a negative of Something,—as an Other. Something as Becoming is transition, having Somethings for its moments; it therefore is change,—a Becoming which has now become concrete.—At first, however, Something merely changes in its concept; it is not yet thus posited as mediating and mediated, but merely as preserving itself in its simplicity as self-related; and its negative is posited equally as something qualitative, as merely Other in general.

(a) Primarily Something and Other are mutually indifferent; an Other, too, is an immediate existence, a Something; so that negation falls outside the two. Something is in itself, as opposed to its Being-for-Other. But determinateness also belongs to its in-itself, and is (b) its determination. This in turn passes over into Modification, which is identical with the determination and constitutes ‘ the immanent and simultaneously negated Being-for-Other, which is the limit of Something, (c) This limit is the immanent determination of Something itself, which accordingly is the Finite.

In the first section in which Determinate Being was considered it had the determination, as there taken, of being. Hence Quality and Something, the moments in its development, also have an affirmative determination. In this section, on the other hand, the negative determination immanent in Determinate Being develops itself. At that point it was merely negation in general, or First negation; here it is precisely determined as the “Being-in-itself” of Something, or the negation of negation.

1. First, Something and Other each are determinate Beings, or Somethings.

Secondly, each is also an Other. Which is mentioned first, and for this reason only has the name of Something, is immaterial. (In Latin, where they occur in one sentence, both are called aliud; “one another” is alius alium; when there is reciprocity the expression alter alterum is analogous.) If we call one determinate Being A and another B, then for the present B is determined as the Other. But A is just as much Other to B. Both are in the same way Others. The word “this” serves to fix the distinction and that Something which is to be taken affirmatively. But “this” clearly expresses that this distinction and emphasizing of one Something is a process of designation, subjective and external to the Something. The entire determinateness falls within this external designation, and even the expression “this” contains no distinction; each and every Something is “this” as much as it also is Other. We fancy that by “this” we are expressing something perfectly definite, overlooking that language, being a work of understanding, expresses universals only, except when it names individual objects; the individual name, however, is meaningless in this sense that it expresses no universal, for which reason it also appears as something merely posited and arbitrary; and indeed proper names may be assumed, bestowed, and also altered at will.

Otherness thus appears as a determination alien to Determinate Being determined in this manner: it is the other and is external to the one Determinate Being; it seems as though one Determinate Being were determined as other partly only by some external intelligence, partly only by virtue of some Other which is outside it, while, for itself, it is not other at all. Simultaneously, as we remarked, every one Determinate Being equally determines itself as an other Determinate Being, even for imagination, so that there does not remain one Determinate Being which is determined merely as such and is not also external to another, and therefore itself an Other.

Both are determined alike as Something and as Other; they are therefore the same, and as yet there is no distinction between them. But also this sameness of the determinations falls within external reflection, within comparison of the two; but according to the manner in which Other is provisionally posited it is indeed in itself in relation to Something, but it is also in itself external to this latter.

Thirdly, therefore, Other must be taken as isolated and in relation only to itself, as Other in the abstract, as τὸ ἕτερον of Plato, who takes it as one of the moments of totality, opposing it to the One and thus ascribing to Other a nature of its own. Thus Other, taken by itself as such, is not Other to Something but Other by itself, that is, its own Other.—Physical Nature is such an entity which is Other according to its determination: it is Other to Spirit; and thus preliminarily this determination is merely relative, and expresses not a quality of Nature but a relation external to it. But Spirit is true Something, and hence Nature by itself is only that which it is relatively to Spirit; therefore, if Nature is taken by itself, its quality is just that it is Other in itself, or that which is external to itself (in the determinations of space, time, and matter).

The Other for itself is the Other in itself, and hence that which is Other to itself, or Other to Other; that which in itself is the absolutely non-identical, the self-negating or changing. But also it remains identical with itself, for the only thing into which it could change is the Other which has no determination except this. But that which changes is determined in no different manner, but in the same, namely, to be Other; consequently the Other in the Other merely collapses into itself. It is thus posited as Something intro-reflected, added to which is a transcendence of otherness; it is a self-identical Something, and otherness, which also is one of its moments, is consequently something separate from it and not appertaining to it as Something.

2. Something preserves itself in its state of non-existence; it is essentially identical, and also essentially non-identical with this state. It therefore is in relation to its otherness, and is not simply its otherness. Otherness is simultaneously contained in and also separated from it: it is Being-for-Other.

Determinate Being as such is something immediate and unrelated: it is within the determination of Being. Since, however, it includes Not-being, it is a Being which is determinate and negated within itself; it next becomes Other; but, since it also preserves itself in its negation, it is merely Being-for-Other.

It preserves itself in its non-existence, and is Being; not Being in general but as relation to itself as opposed to its relation to Other, or as self-equality as opposed to inequality to itself. Such a Being is Being-in-Self.

Being-for-Other and Being-in-Self constitute the two moments of Something. Two pairs of determinations occur here—(1) Something and Other, (2) Being-for-Other and Being-in-Self. The first contains the unrelatedness which constitutes their determinateness: Something and Other fall apart. But their relation is their truth; therefore Being-for-Other and Being-in-Self are the above determinations posited as moments of one and the same thing, determinations which are relations and remain in their unity, the unity of Determinate Being. Thus, also, each of them contains the other moment which is distinct from it.

Being and Nothing in their unity (which is Determinate Being) are no more than Being and Nothing; it is only outside their unity that they are more: but in their restless unity, in Becoming, they are Arising and Passing Away.—In Something, Being is Being-in-Self. Being, or self-relation and self-identity, is now no longer immediate; it is self-relation only in so far as it is the Not-being of otherness, that is, intro-reflected Determinate Being.—Similarly, Not-being as moment of Something in this unity of Being and Not-being is not non-existence in general, but Other, and, more definitely, after the distinction of Being from it, it also is relation to its non-existence, or Being-for-Other.

Thus Being-in-Self is, first, negative relation to non-existence; otherness is external to and opposed to it; so far as Something is in itself it is removed beyond the sphere of otherness and of Being-for-Other. But, secondly, it also has Not-being in itself, since it is itself the Not-being of Being-for-Other.

But Being-for-Other is, first, the negation of the simple self-relation of Being, which in the first instance is supposed to be Determinate Being, and Something: in so far as Something is in or for an Other, it lacks its own Being. But, secondly, it is not non-existence equivalent to pure Nothing: it is a non-existence which points to Being-in-Self as its own intro-reflected Being; just as conversely Being-in-Self refers to Being-for-Other.

3. Both these moments are determinations of one and the same thing, namely, of Something. Something is in itself in so far as it has returned to itself from Being-for-Other. But, also, Something has a determination, or circumstance, in itself (the accent here is on “in”), or in it, in so far as this circumstance is “in” it externally, and is a Being-for-Other.

This leads to a further determination. Primarily, Being-in-Self and Being-for-Other are distinct; but, further, Something also has in itself that which it is in itself, and conversely it is in itself what it is as Being-for-Other; and this fact constitutes the identity of Being-in-Self and Being-for-Other, according to the determination that Something is equivalent to each of the moments, which therefore are comprehended in it as unseparated.—Formally, this identity already results in the sphere of Determinate Being, but more expressly in the consideration of Essence and further of the Relation of Internality and Externality, and most precisely in the contemplation of the Idea as unity of Notion and Actuality.—We imagine that we express something lofty in saying “in itself,” as in saying “inner”; but that which Something is only in itself, this is only “in” this Something: “in itself” is a merely abstract and therefore external determination. The expressions “there is nothing in him,” or “there’s something in it,” imply, though dimly, that that which is “in” a thing belongs to its Being-in-Self, to its true and inner worth.

We may remark that the meaning of the Thing-in-itself here becomes plain: it is a very simple abstraction, though for some time it was considered a most important and, as it were, high-class determination, just as the proposition, that we do not know what Things-in-themselves are, was a piece of wisdom held in wide esteem.—Things are called “in themselves” in so far as we abstract from all Being-for-Other, which means that they are thought of as quite without determination, as Nothings. In this sense it is indeed impossible to know what the Thing-in-itself is. For the question “what” demands that determinations should be indicated; and since it is postulated that the things of which these are to be predicated must be Things-in-themselves, that is, indeterminate, the question, in sheer thoughtlessness, is so put as to render an answer either impossible or self-contradictory.—The Thing-in-itself is like that Absolute of which we know only that in it all things are one. It is therefore easy to know what is in these Things-in-themselves: as such, they are mere abstractions, void of truth and content. It is Logic which demonstrates what a Thing-in-itself is in truth, and what truly is in itself; but here “in itself” is taken as something better than abstraction, namely, as that which something is by virtue of its concept: and the concept is concrete in itself; being a concept it may be conceived, and, being determinate and a concatenation of its determinations, it is in itself knowable.

Being-for-Other stands to Being-in-Self in the relation of contrasted moment; but Positedness also is contrasted with Being-in-Self. Though this expression, too, contains Being-for-Other, it also contains, definitely, the already accomplished refraction of that which is not in itself into its Being-in-Self, where it is positive. Generally Being-in-Self may be taken as an abstract manner of expressing the concept; Positing properly falls only within the sphere of Essence, or objective Reflection; Ground posits that which is grounded in it; and Cause even more produces an effect—a Determinate Being, of which the independence is immediately negated and which has in it the meaning that it has its base, or being, in an Other. In the sphere of Being, Determinate Being merely proceeds forth from Becoming; or, with Something an Other is posited and with the Finite the Infinite; but the Finite does not produce, does not itself posit, the Infinite. In the sphere of Being the self-determination of the concept is only in itself, and is called a transition; and the reflective determinations of Being, like Something and Other or Finite and Infinite, although they essentially point to one another, or exist as Being-for-Other, yet count as qualitative and as persisting for themselves; Other is, and Finite is counted, as being immediately and persisting for itself, no less than Infinite; the meaning of each appears complete even without its other. But positive and negative, and cause and effect, in however isolated a manner they are taken, are meaningless one without the other; they show in each other, and each shows in its other, and this is implied in themselves.—In the several circles of determination, and more especially in the progress of the demonstration or rather in the progress of the Notion towards its demonstration, it is a main point always to distinguish what is still in itself and what is posited’, as with the determinations, whether they are in the concept, or posited and being-for-other. This distinction is proper only to dialectical development and is unknown to the metaphysical (which includes the Critical) philosophy. The definitions, postulates, distinctions, and conclusions of metaphysics intend to produce and assert only what is in the category of Being, and, more precisely, of Being-for-Self.

In the self-unity of Something, Being-for-Other is identical with its in-itself; thus Being-for-Other is in Something. Determinateness thus reflected into self is therefore once more one which simply is, and thus is a Quality—Determination.

This “in-itself,” into which as back upon itself Something is reflected from its Being-for-Other, is no longer abstract “in-itself” but mediated, since it is the negation of its Being-for-Other; this, therefore, is its moment. It is not merely the immediate self-identity of Something, but that identity through which Something is in it (the in-itself) that which it is in itself: it has Being-for-Other in itself because “in-itself” is the transcendence of this latter and is in itself having passed out from it; but also because it is abstract and therefore essentially infected with negation and Being-for-Other. Here there is not only Quality and Reality, or existent determinateness, but determinateness which is in itself: the course of development consists in positing it as this intro-reflected determinateness.

1. Quality, which constitutes the in-itself in the simple Something, essentially in unity with its other moment, being-in-it, may be called its Determination, in so far as this word is distinguished in its exact meaning from determinateness. Determination is affirmative determinateness: it is Being-in-Self to which existent Something remains conformable, opposing any entanglement with Other, which would determine it; it thus remains equal to itself, and gives weight to this equality in its Being-for-Other. It fulfils its Determination in so far as the further determinateness which springs up in many shapes owing to its relation to Other, becomes adequate to its Being-in-Self, becomes its fulfilment. Determination contains this, that what Something is in itself, it also has in itself.

The Determination of man is thinking reason: thinking in general is his simple determinateness, which distinguishes him from the beast: he is Thought in himself, in so far as this is also distinct from his Being-for-Other which immediately connects him with Other—namely his natural and sensuous quality. But also man has thought in himself: man is thought, it is as thinking that he is, and this is his existence and actuality; and, further, since it is in his Determinate Being and his Determinate Being is in thought, it must be taken as concrete, as having content and filling; it is thinking reason, and thus the Determination of man. But, in itself, even this determination is no more than an Ought; that is, with the filling which is incorporated with its in-itself, it is in the form of in-itself in general in opposition to such Determinate Being as is not incorporated with it, which latter may also be taken as an externally opposite and immediate sensuousness and nature.

2. The fulfilling of Being-in-Self with determinateness is also distinct from such determinateness as is only Being-for-Other and remains outside the determination. For, in the field of the qualitative, distinctions, when they exist as transcended, retain, relatively to one another, immediate and qualitative Being. That which Something has in itself divides up in this manner, and in this direction is external Determinate Being of the Something, which also is its Determinate Being, but does not belong to its Being-in-Self.—Thus determinateness is Modification.

Modified in this or that manner, Something is conceived as being externally influenced and related. This external relation on which Modification depends, and the fact that determination takes place through the medium of an Other, appears as contingent. But it is the quality of Something to be subject to this external influence and to have a Modification. In so far as Something changes, the change falls within its Modification: it is that element within the Something which becomes an Other. The Something preserves itself in the change, which affects only this unstable surface of its otherness and not its Determination. Thus Determination and Modification are distinct: according to its Determination, Something remains indifferent to its Modification; while that which Something has in itself is the middle term of this syllogism and connects the two. But it appeared that to belong to Something analysed itself into these two extremes. Determinateness as such is the simple mean; and both Determination and Modification belong to its identity. But, for itself, Determination passes over into Modification, and Modification into Determination. This much is implied in what has been said already; more precisely, the connexion is as follows: In so far as Something has in itself what it is in itself, it is infected with Being-for-Other; and hence Determination as such remains liable to a relation to Other. Determinateness is also a moment; but simultaneously it contains this qualitative distinction, that it differs from Being-in-Self and is the negative of Something, an other Determinate Being. Determinateness which thus comprehends Other, when united with Being-in-Self, introduces otherness into Being-in-Self (or Determination); the latter thus is reduced to Modification.—Conversely, Being-for-Other posited as Modification—that is isolated and by itself—is, in itself, the same as is Other as such, that is, that which is Other to itself, or of itself; taken thus it is self-related Determinate Being, or Being-in-Self with a determinateness; that is, Determination.—But the two must also be kept distinct: hence Modification, whose very basis appears to be in something external, or Other, also depends upon Determination, and the alien determining is also determined by the determination proper to and immanent in the Something. But, further, Modification belongs to that which the Something is in itself: Something changes with its Modification.

This mutation of Something no longer is its first change according to its Being-for-Other: the former was change in itself only, and proper to the inner concept; now the change is that which is posited of Something.—Something has itself been further determined, and the negation has been posited as immanent in it, or as its developed Being-in-Self.

At first the transition into each other of Determination and Modification is the transcendence of the distinction between them; here Determinate Being or Something in general is posited. It is the result of the distinction which comprehends within itself qualitative otherness: there thus are two Somethings, which are not merely Other to each other (in which case this negation would be only abstract and dependent on comparison), but the negation is immanent in these Somethings. As existent they are indifferent to each other, but this their affirmation is no longer immediate, and each is related to itself through the transcendence of otherness, which, in the determination, is reflected into Being-in-Self.

Something is in this relation to Other from its own nature and because otherness is posited in it as its own moment: its Being-in-Self comprehends negation, through which alone it now has its affirmative existence. From this, however, Other is distinct qualitatively, too, and thus it is posited as outside Something. The negation of its Other is only the quality of Something, for it is just as this cancellation of its Other that it is Something. It is only through this that Other opposes itself to a Determinate Being: it is only in an external manner that Other is opposed to the first Something; or else, if they are in fact connected absolutely (or according to their concept), the connection is merely this, that Determinate Being has passed over into otherness, or Something into Other, so that Something is Other just as much as Other is. Now in so far as Being-in-Self is the Not-being of otherness, which is contained in it, but also distinguished from it by virtue of its quality of being, Something itself is negation, namely this negation, that an Other ceases when Something begins: it is posited as remaining negative towards it, and as thus preserving itself;—and this Other, the Being-in-Self of Something taken as negation of negation, is its Being as such; and also this cancellation as simple negation is a quality it has, the quality of negating the other Something external to it. It is one determinateness of these, and it is identical with the Being-in-Self of Somethings (as negation of negation); and it also (since these negations now stand in the relation of other Somethings to each other) makes them spontaneously to coalesce while simultaneously severing them, one negating the other. This is Limit.

3. Being-for-Other is indeterminate and affirmative community of Something with its Other: in Limit, Not-being-for-Other becomes prominent, which is qualitative negation of Other; the latter thereby is kept away from intro-reflected Something. It remains to see the development of this concept, which soon, however, reveals itself as a confusion and a contradiction. The latter is immediately found in this fact, that Limit, as the intro-reflected negation of Something, contains ideally the moments of Something and Other, while these as distinct moments are posited in the sphere of Determinate Being as real and as qualitatively distinct.

α. Something then is immediate and self-related Determinate Being, and has a Limit, first, as in relation to Other: it is the not-being of Other, not of Something itself; in the Limit Something delimits its Other.—But Other is, itself, and in general, a Something: therefore, the Limit which Something has relatively to Other is Limit also of Other relatively to Something, it is that Limit by means of which Other keeps distinct the first Something as its own Other; in other words, it is a not-being of this Something. It is thus not only not-being of Other but of both Somethings equally, and thus of Something in general.

But essentially also it is the not-being of Other, and thus Something also exists by virtue of its Limit. True, in so far as Something exists as limiting, it itself is degraded to the rank of something limited; but its Limit (which is the fact that Other ends where it begins) also is no more than the Being of Something: through it the latter is what it is and has its quality in it.—This relation is the external aspect of the fact that Limit is simple (or first) negation, while Other is negation of negation or the Being-in-Self of Something.

Something as immediate Determinate Being is, therefore, Limit with reference to another Something; but this Limit is also its own, and if it is Something, it is so only through the mediation of this which is equally its not-being. Limit is the mediation through which Something and Other is and also is not.

β. Now, in so far as Something simultaneously is and is not in its Limit, and these moments are an immediate and qualitative distinction, the Determinate Being and not-being of Something fall apart. Something has its Determinate Being without (or also, as we imagine it, within) its Limit; and so too Other, because it is Something, is outside it. Limit is the mean between the two, in which they cease. They have their Determinate Being beyond one another and beyond their Limit: Limit as the not-being of either is the Other of both.

According to this distinction of Something from its Limit, the line appears as line only outside its limit, the point; the plane as plane outside of the line; and body as body only outside its limit, the plane.—It is from this aspect that Limit first strikes imagination (the externalization of the concept), and is also chiefly applied to spatial objects.

γ. But further, Something as it is outside the Limit, or unlimited Something, is just Determinate Being in general. Here it is not distinct from its Other: it is only Determinate Being and has the same determination as its Other; each is only Something in general and also Other: both are the same. But this their at first immediate Determinate Being is now posited with determinateness as Limit, in which both are what they are distinctly from one another. But also Limit is their common distinctness, their unity and distinctness, like Determinate Being. This double identity (Determinate Being and Limit) of both, implies that Something has its Determinate Being only in Limit, and also (since immediate Determinate Being and Limit are negative of one another) that Something, which only exists within its Limit, severs itself from itself and points beyond itself to its not-being and predicates this as its Being, thus passing over into it. To apply this to the former example, one determination is that Something is what it is only within its Limit;—thus the point is not limit of the line only in the sense that the line only ceases in it and, as Determinate Being, exists outside it; the line is not limit of the plane only in the sense that the plane only ceases in the line; and so with the plane as limit of the body: rather the line begins in the point; it is its absolute beginning; even in so far as it is imagined as unlimited in either direction, or produced to infinity, as it is put,—even then the point is its element, and the line the element of the plane, and the plane of the body. These limits are the principle of that which they limit; just a one (e.g. as hundredth) is limit, but also is element of the whole hundred.

The other determination is the unrest of Something in its Limit; it is immanent in the Limit to be a contradiction which send? Something on beyond itself. Thus point is this self-dialectic which becomes line, line that which becomes plane, and plane that which becomes total space. There is a second definition of line, plane, and cubic space, namely that the line is created through the movement of a point, the plane through the movement of a line, and so forth. This movement of the point, the line, and so forth, is, however, taken as something merely contingent or imaginary. This assumption is really, however, retracted when it is said that the determinations from which line and so forth are to be evolved are their elements and principles; and these also are nothing else than their Limits: this creation, therefore, is not looked on as merely contingent or imaginary. It is part of the concept of the Limit which is immanent to Something that point, line, and plane in themselves, as self-contradictory, are self-repellent beginnings; so that the point (for instance) passes from itself into the line because its concept is what it is; it moves in itself, and thus creates line. The application, however, belongs to the consideration of Space; to give an indication of it here, point is purely abstract Limit, but it is so within a Determinate Being: and as yet the latter is taken in a quite indeterminate manner, being so-called absolute (that is, abstract) Space, or entirely continuous being-separate. And Limit is not abstract negation but is in a given determinate Existence and is spatial determinateness; and hence the point is spatial, the contradiction of abstract negation and of continuity, and so incipient and perfected transition into line, and so forth; and indeed “there is” no such thing as point, or line, or plane.

Something, posited with its immanent Limit as self-contradiction through which it is driven and forced beyond itself, is the Finite.

Existence is determinate; Something has a quality, and in it is limited as well as merely determined: its quality is its limit, and, affected with this, it at first remains affirmative and quiescent Determinate Being. But when this negation is developed to show that the opposition between its Determinate Being and negation as its immanent limit, is itself the Being-in-Self of Something, and that thus this latter is in itself just Becoming, then these facts constitute its Finitude.

When we say of things that they are finite, we mean thereby not only that they have a determinateness, that quality is here reality and self-existent determination, and that they are merely limited; for then they still have Determinate Being outside their limit;—but rather that Not-being constitutes their nature and their Being. Finite things are; but their relation to themselves is this, that, being negative, they are self-related, and in this self-relation send themselves on beyond themselves and their being. They are, but the truth of this being is their end. The finite does not only change, like Something in general, but it perishes; and its perishing is not merely contingent, so that it could be without perishing. It is rather the very being of finite things, that they contain the seeds of perishing as their own Being-in-Self, and the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.

The thought of the Finitude of things brings with it this sorrow, because it is quintessential qualitative negation, and because in the simplicity of this kind of determination no affirmative Being is left them as distinct from their determination to destruction. Because of this qualitative simplicity of negation, which has gone back to the abstract opposition between Nothing and Passing Away, on the one hand, and Being, on the other, Finitude is the most stubborn category of understanding. Negation in general, Modification, and Limit do not war with their Other, that is, Determinate Being; and even abstract Nothing is abandoned as an abstraction; but Finitude is negation based on itself and is therefore in abrupt opposition to its affirmative. It is true that the finite can be put in motion: it is itself the fact that it is determined as doomed to end, but only to end;—or, rather, it is the refusal to move affirmatively to its affirmative, the Infinite, and to allow itself to be connected with it; it is therefore posited inseparably from its Nothing, and every reconciliation with its Other, the affirmative, is thus precluded. The determination of finite things is none other than their end. Understanding persists in this sorrow of Finitude by making not-being the determination of things, and also making it at once enduring and absolute. Their perishability could perish only in their Other, the affirmative, but then their Finitude would leave them; but this Finitude is their unchanging quality,—quality, that is to say, which does not pass over into its Other, or, in other words, into its affirmative. It is thus eternal.

This consideration is of great importance; but certainly no philosophy, nor opinion, nor Understanding in general, will allow itself to be saddled with the point of view that the finite is absolute; rather, the opposite is expressly present in the assertion of the finite. The finite is that which is bounded and perishable: it is only finite and not imperishable: this is implied immediately in its determination and expression. But the question is whether speculation persists in the Being of Finitude, and perishability remains, or perishability and perishing perish? And it is precisely in that view of the finite which makes perishing the end of all finite things, that this does not happen. It is expressly asserted that between finite and infinite no peace and no union are possible, that finite is absolutely opposed to infinite. Being, absolute Being, is ascribed to the infinite: the finite is retained in opposition to it as its negative; and, incompatible with the infinite, it remains absolute upon its own side. From the affirmative, or infinite, it would receive affirmation, and thus itself would perish; but a union with it is just that which is declared to be impossible. If it is not to remain opposed to the infinite, but to perish, then, as was said above, it is perishing which is its end, and not the affirmative, which would only be a perishing of perishing. But, if the finite should not perish in the affirmative, and should its end be taken as being Nothing, then we should have returned to that first and abstract Nothing, which has perished long ago.

With this Nothing, however, which is to be merely Nothing, and yet is granted an existence in thought, imagination, or speech, the same contradiction occurs as was just indicated in the Finite, with this difference, that it merely occurs in the first and abstract Nothing, while in Finitude it is expressed. There it appears as subjective, here the perennial opposition of finite and infinite is upheld,—the finite being that which in itself is null, and exists as such. This must be made evident; and the development of the finite shows that it is here that, because it is this contradiction, it collapses into itself, while at the same time it actually resolves the contradiction by showing, not that it is merely perishable and perishes, but that perishing, or Nothing, is not the last word, but perishes itself.

Abstractly, indeed, this contradiction is at once present in the fact that Something is finite, or that the Finite is. But Something or Being is no longer posited as abstract, it is intro-reflected and developed as Being-in-Self having a determination and modification, or, more closely, a limit, which, as that which is immanent in the Something and constitutes the quality of its Being-in-Self, is Finitude. We must now see what moments are contained in this concept of the finite Something.

It was seen that determination and modification were different aspects for external reflection; but already the former contained otherness as belonging to the nature of Something by itself; the externality of otherness is on the one hand contained in the proper internality of Something, but, on the other, as externality it remains distinct from it; it is still externality as such, but applied to a Something. But since, further, otherness is itself determined as limit, or negation of negation, the otherness immanent to Something is posited as the relation of the two sides; and the self-identity of Something to which both determination and modification belong is its introverted relation, or that relation which negates its immanent limit relating the self-existent determination to it. Thus, self-identical Being-in-Self relates itself to itself as its own not-being, but in the shape of negation of negation, or as negating that which simultaneously retains Determinate Being in itself, since it is the quality of its Being-in-Self. The proper limit of Something, thus posited of it as something negative and also essential, is no longer Limit as such, but Barrier. But Barrier is not only that which is posited as negated: the negation acts both ways, since that which it posits as negated is Limit; for this latter is that which is common to Something and Other, and also is the determinateness of the Being-in-Self of the determination as such. This Being-in-Self is then the negative relation to its limit (which also is distinct from it), or to itself taken as Barrier: that is, Ought.

In Order that the limit applying to Something in general should also be Barrier, Something must pass over into itself beyond the limit; it must, referring to itself, relate itself to it as to something which is not. The Determinate Being of Something lies undisturbed and indifferent, so to speak beside its limit. But Something passes beyond its limit only in so far as it accomplishes its cancellation and is negative Being-in-Self relatively to it. And since in determination Limit itself exists as Barrier, Something thus passes beyond itself.

Ought thus contains a double determination, first as self-existent determination relatively to negation, secondly as a not-being, which, as Barrier, is distinguished from it, but also itself is self-existent determination.

Thus the finite has determined itself as the relation of its determination to its limit: in this relation the former is Ought and the latter Barrier. Thus both are moments of the finite; and both themselves are thus finite, Ought as well as Barrier. But it is only Barrier which is posited as finite: Ought is restricted only in itself (and thus for us). It is restricted by the relation to the limit already immanent in it, but this restriction is wrapped up in Being-in-Self, for, according to its Determinate Being, that is, its determinateness in relation to Barrier, it is posited as Being-in-Self.

What ought to be is, and also is not; for if it were, then it could not also be the case that it ought to be. Thus, essentially, Ought has a Barrier. This Barrier is nothing alien: that which merely ought to be is the determination which now is posited as it is in fact, namely, as being also just a determinateness.

Thus the Being-in-Self of Something in its determination reduces itself to Ought by reason of the fact that that which constitutes its Being-in-Self exists, in exactly the same respect, as Not-being. This takes place in the following manner: in Self-existence (or the negation of negation) this Being-in-Self, as being one of the two negations (as that which negates), is one with the other, which also exists as a qualitatively other limit, whereby this unity exists as relation to it. The Barrier of the finite is nothing external; its own determination is also its barrier: and this latter is Ought as well; it is that which is common to both, or rather that wherein both are identical.

But the finite further, as Ought, passes beyond its Barrier; the very determinateness which is its negation is also transcended, and thus is its Being-in-Self: its limit is also not its limit.

Something, as Ought, thus rises superior to its Barrier; but, conversely, it has a Barrier only as Ought. Both are inseparable. Something has a Barrier in so far as it contains negation in its determination, and the determination is also the accomplished transcendence of the Barrier.

Ought has latterly played a great part in philosophy, chiefly in relation to morality and, in a more general metaphysical manner, as the last and most absolute concept of the identity of Being-in-Self, or self-reference, and determinateness or limit.

“Thou canst because thou oughtest”—this expression, by which much is intended, is implied in the very concept of Ought. For Ought is the accomplished transgression of the barrier; in it, limit is transcended, and thus Ought’s Being-in-Self is identical self-relation and is hence the abstraction of “Can.”—But the converse is equally correct: “Thou canst not just because thou oughtest.” For Barrier, as Barrier, is equally implied in Ought; and the first-mentioned formalism of possibility finds in it a reality and qualitative otherness opposed to itself: the relation of the two to each other is one of contradictoriness, and thus of “Cannot,” or rather of impossibility.

At Ought the transgression beyond finitude, Infinity, begins. Ought is that which, leaving behind impossibility, manifests itself in its development as progress into the infinite.

Coming to details we may criticize two prejudices with regard to the form of Barrier and Ought. First, the barrier of Thought, of Reason, and so on, is often held in high respect, and it is asserted that no progress can be made beyond the barrier. When this assertion is made it is not seen that by the very fact that something has been determined as barrier, it has already been surpassed. For any determinateness or limit is determined as barrier only as opposed to its Other in general, that is, something unrestricted: for the Other of a barrier is just the beyond. A stone or metal is not beyond its barrier just because, for it, it is not barrier. But if, in such general propositions of understanding thought as deny the possibility of transgressing the barrier, thought refuses to apply itself to examining the contents of the concept, then it must be referred to actuality, where such propositions turn out the least actual things of all Just because thought “ought” to be above actuality, dwelling apart from it in higher regions, so that itself is determined as an Ought, it firstly does not pass on to the concept, and, secondly, finds itself in an attitude equally invalid relatively to actuality as to the concept.—The stone thinks not nor has it even any sensation; for it, therefore, its restrictedness is no barrier, that is, it is no negation of sensation, imagination, or thought for the stone, since it does not possess these faculties. But even the stone, as Something, is distinguished into its determination (or Being-in-Self), and its Determinate Being, and in this respect even it passes beyond its barrier; the concept which it is in itself implies the identity with its Other. If it is a base, and is capable of being acted on by an acid, it may be oxidized, neutralized, and so forth. In oxidization, neutralization, and so forth, its barrier, which is, to exist only as base, cancels itself: it passes beyond, and similarly acid cancels its barrier, which is, to be acid; and in the case of acid (as in that of caustic base) so much is it true that it “ought” to pass beyond its barrier, that force must be employed to keep them apart as (waterless, i.e. purely non-neutral) acid and caustic base.

But where an existent contains the concept, not as abstract Being-in-Self, but as a totality which is for itself, as impulse, life, sensation, imagination, and so on, then it has achieved through its own power the passage of the barrier and an existence beyond it. The plant passes over the barrier of existing as a seed, and over the barrier of existing as blossom, fruit, or leaf; the seed becomes the unfolded plant, the blossom fades, and so forth. In the barrier of hunger, of thirst, and so on, the sentient element is the impulse to pass beyond this barrier, and it also completes this egress. It feels pain, and it is the privilege of sentient nature to feel pain: it is a negation within its self, and it is determined as a barrier in its sensibility just because whatever is sentient has the sensation of its self which is the totality that exists beyond this determinateness. If it were not beyond it, then it would not feel it as its negation, and would feel no pain.—And then we are told that Reason, and Thought, cannot pass beyond its barrier,—Reason, which is the universal and therefore in itself is beyond abstract, that is, beyond all, particularity; which is nothing if not egress beyond the barrier.—It is true that not every passage and existence beyond the barrier is a veritable emancipation from it, or a veritable affirmation. Ought itself, and abstraction in general, is such an incomplete egress. But it is enough to point to the purely abstract universal to refute the equally abstract asseveration that no progress beyond the barrier is possible; or to point to the infinite in general to refute the asseveration that no progress is possible beyond the finite.

We may here mention a notion of Leibniz, which appears ingenious; namely, that, if a magnet had consciousness, it would consider its direction to the north as a determination of its will, or a law applied to its freedom. Much rather, if it had consciousness, and therefore will and freedom, it could think: and then space for it would be a universal containing all directions, so that the one direction towards the north would be a barrier to its freedom, as much as it would be a barrier to the freedom of a man to be kept at one point, but not for a plant.

On the other hand Ought is an egress beyond the barrier, but one which itself is only finite. In the sphere of finitude therefore it has its place and its validity, where it maintains Being-in-Self against that which is restricted, asserting it as Rule and as essential against the void. Duty is Ought turned against individual will, against selfish desire and capricious interest: and this is put before will as an Ought in so far as, in its mobility, it can isolate itself from the veritable. There are those who esteem the Ought of morality thus highly, and see an attempt to destroy morality in the refusal to accept the Ought as something ultimate and veritable; there are reasoners whose understanding indulges in the unceasing satisfaction of being able to adduce, against everything which is, an Ought, and thus a superior knowledge, and therefore also decline to see themselves robbed of their Ought: these do not see that, as regards the finitude of their sphere, the Ought is fully recognized.—But in actual fact Reason and Law are at no such sorry pass as that they merely “ought” to be; it is only the abstraction of Being-in-Self which stops dead at that point;—nor yet is Ought in itself perpetual, nor finitude (which would be the same) absolute. The philosophy of Kant and Fichte calls Ought the highest point of the resolution of the contradictions of Reason: in truth, this is only the standpoint where they persist in finitude, and (which is the same thing) in contradiction.

in itself Ought contains Barrier; and Barrier, Ought. Their relation to each other is Finitude itself, which, in its Being-in-Self, contains them both. These moments of its determination are qualitatively opposite, Barrier being determined as the negation of Ought, and similarly Ought as the negation of Barrier. The Finite thus is self-contradictory; it cancels itself and passes away. But this result, namely, the negative in general, is (a) its proper determination; for it is the negative of the negative. Thus the finite in perishing has not perished; so far it has only become another finite, which, however, in turn perishes in the sense of passing over into another finite, and so on, perhaps ad infinitum. But ()3) if this result is more closely considered, the finite in perishing, in this negation of its self, has reached its Being-in-Self, and therefore has here collapsed into itself. Each of its moments contains just this result: Ought passes beyond the Barrier, that is, beyond itself: but that which is beyond it (its Other) is precisely the Barrier. But Barrier immediately points on beyond itself to its Other, which is Ought; this, however, is that same antagonism of Being-in-Self and Determinate Being, which Barrier is itself; it is the same thing. Thus it passes beyond itself only to collapse again into itself. This self-identity, or negation of negation, is affirmative Being, or the Other of the Finite, which is supposed to have the first negation as its determinateness;—this Other is the Infinite.

In its simple concept the Infinite may be regarded, first, as a fresh definition of the Absolute; as indeterminate self-relation it is posited as Being and Becoming. The forms of Determinate Being do not form part of the series of determinations which can be regarded as definitions of the Absolute, since each form of that sphere is posited immediately for itself merely as a determinateness, or as finite in general. But the infinite is considered as absolute in itself, since it is expressly determined as negation of the finite, and thus in the infinite an express attitude is taken to the quality of being subject to barrier (of which Being and Becoming, though in themselves they neither have nor show this quality, might yet be in some way capable); and in fact this quality is negated in the infinite.

But this in itself is not sufficient to remove the infinite beyond finitude and the quality of being subject to barrier; the main point is, to distinguish the true concept of infinity from bad infinity, the infinite of Reason from that of Understanding; the latter is the infinite made finite, and it will appear that, just when it is to be kept unspotted and removed from the finite, the infinite is made finite.

The Infinite

(a) is, in simple determination, the affirmative as negation of the Finite;

(b) thereby, however, is in Reciprocal Determination with the Finite, and is abstract or one-.sided Infinite;

(c) the self-transcendence of this Infinite and of the Finite, taken as one process, is the veritable Infinite.

The Infinite is the negation of negation, the affirmation or Being which has re-issued from its quality of being subject to barrier. The infinite is, and is in a more intensive sense than the first immediate Being; it is veritable Being, elation above the barrier. The name of the Infinite kindles in the mind and the spirit a light; for here it not only rests abstractly by itself, but rather rises to itself, to the light of its thought, its universality, and its freedom.

It has appeared, first, with regard to the concept of the infinite, that Determinate Being in its Being-in-Self determines itself as finite and passes beyond its barrier. It is the nature of the finite to pass beyond itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite. The infinite thus does not stand above the finite as something complete in itself, the finite still permanently remaining without or beneath it. As yet we pass from the finite into the infinite only as a subjective Reason. Thus when we say that the infinite is a concept of Reason, and that we rise by Reason above temporality, we do this without infringing upon finitude, which this exaltation (since it remains external to it) does not concern. But also, since it is the finite which is raised into the infinite, it is no external power which impels it to do so; rather it is its nature to relate itself to itself as barrier, (both as barrier as such and as Ought,) and to pass beyond it; or, rather, to have negated it as relation to itself and to be in the state of having passed beyond it. Infinity in general is not created by the cancellation of finitude in general: the finite is just that which itself becomes infinity through its own nature. Infinity is its affirmative determination, or that which it veritably is in itself.

Thus the finite has disappeared in the infinite, and what is, is nothing but the infinite.

The Infinite is, and in this immediacy it also is the negation of an Other—the Finite. Since thus it is, and also is the not-being of an Other, it has fallen back into the category of Something with a limit (in the sense of anything determinate in general); more exactly, this is so because it is posited as intro-reflected Determinate Being which results from the cancellation of determinateness in general and thus is distinct from its determinateness.—In consequence of this determinateness, the Finite stands over against the Infinite as real Determinate Being they thus stand in qualitative relation as entities remaining external to each other. The immediate Being of the Infinite resuscitates the Being of its negation, the Finite, which for the moment had appeared to vanish into the Infinite.

Infinite and Finite are not however in these two categories of relation only; the relation of the two sides is more closely determined than that they should be mere Others to each other. For the finite is barrier posited as barrier; it is Determinate Being posited with the determination to pass over into its Being-in-Self, to become infinite. Infinity is the Nothing of the Finite, it is its Being-in-Self and Ought, but is so as Ought fulfilled and intro-reflected, as Being self-related only and wholly affirmative. There is this to satisfy the mind in Infinity, that all determinateness, change, barrier, and therefore even Ought itself, have disappeared, and that, these cancelled, the Nothing of the Finite is now posited. Being-in-Self is determined as this negation of the Finite; as negation of negation it thus is affirmative in itself. But this affirmation, since it is qualitatively immediate self-relation, is Being; and thus the Infinite has been brought back to the category where it has the Finite over against it as an Other; its negative nature is posited as being, and therefore as first and immediate negation. Thus the Infinite is infected with the opposition to the Finite, which, since it is Other, remains determinate and real Being, although in its Being-in-Self—the Infinite—it is also posited as cancelled: this is the Non-finite,—a Being in the determinateness of negation. In opposition to the Finite, the sphere of existent determinatenesses, of realities, there stands the Infinite, the indeterminate void, the beyond of the Finite, whose Being-in-Self does not depend on its Determinate Being, which is a determinate.

When the infinite is posited in this qualitative relation of opposition to the finite as to its Other, it must be called the bad infinite or the infinite of Understanding, which takes it for the highest and absolute truth. The contradictions which assail it from every side when it undertakes to apply and explain these its categories, should suffice to make it aware that, while it thinks to have reached a point of satisfaction in this reconciliation of truth, it in fact remains in a state of contradiction unreconciled, unresolved, and absolute.

This contradiction is immediately found in the fact that the finite remains opposed to the infinite as a Determinate Being; thus there are two determinatenesses: there are two worlds, the finite and the infinite, which being related the infinite is but the limit of the finite, and thus is merely an infinite itself determinate and finite.

This contradiction develops its content into more express forms.—The finite is real Determinate Being, which remains so still even after the transition has been made to its not-being, the infinite;—and this, as has been shown, is determined relatively to the finite merely as first, or immediate, negation; and the latter, opposed to this negation, and as negated, has merely the meaning of an Other, and therefore still is Something. And thus when Understanding, rising from this finite world, climbs to its highest height, the infinite, the finite world still remains as something on this side of it; the infinite is placed merely above the finite and separate from it, by which process precisely the finite is separated from the infinite. Each is set in a different place: the finite is Determinate Being “on this side”; the infinite, although it is the in-itself of the finite, is yet placed on the far side, in a dim and inaccessible distance, outside of which the finite is supposed to be and remain.

Thus separated, however, they are also, and equally essentially, related to each other by the very negation which separates them. This negation which relates these intro-reflected Somethings is the mutual limit of One opposed to an Other; the manner in which this happens is this, that each has the negation not merely in its other, as opposed to the other; rather, the negation is their Being-in-Self, each has the limit in itself for itself in its separation from the other. But the limit here is the first negation: thus both are limited and finite in themselves. Also, however, each, as being affirmatively self-relating, is the negation of its limit; it immediately casts off the limit as its not-being, and thus qualitatively separated from it posits it as another Being outside itself: the finite positing its not-being as this infinite, and the infinite as the finite. It is gladly admitted that the transition from finite to infinite is necessary (that is, in accordance with the determination of the finite), and that the former is elevated to Being-in-Self; for the finite is determined as a Determinate Being which, though it persists, yet is determined as inherently working its own dissolution and nullity, while the infinite, though its determination infects it with negation and limit, also is that which is in itself, so that this abstraction of the self-relating affirmation constitutes its determination, and finite Determinate Being accordingly is not implicit in it. But it has been shown that the infinite itself reaches the result of affirmative Being only through negation (namely, as negation of negation), and that this its affirmation, taken as merely simple, qualitative Being, reduces the negation it contains to mere simple and immediate negation, and thus to determinateness and limit; and this, as contradictory to its Being-in-Self, is excluded from it, and is thus posited as not belonging to it but rather opposed to its Being-in-Self,—in short, as finite. Each in itself and from its determination thus being the positing of the other, the two are inseparable. But this unity lies hidden in their qualitative otherness, it is internal and only basic.

This determines the manner in which this unity manifests itself: posited in the category of Determinate Being, it is a metamorphosis or transition of finite into infinite, and conversely; the infinite being the background against which the finite merely shows forth, and similarly the infinite showing forth against the finite, or Other against Other. In short, each has its immediate origin in the other, their relation being merely external.

In detail the process of transition takes the following form. We pass beyond the finite to the infinite. This egress appears as an external activity. What is it that arises in this void which is beyond the finite? What is its positive element? Finite and infinite being inseparable (or, because the infinite, standing aloof on its own side, itself is subject to barrier), the limit arises: the infinite has disappeared, and its Other, the finite, has taken its place. But this entrance of the finite appears as an event external to the infinite; and the new limit as something which has not arisen out of the infinite itself, but likewise is accidentally discovered. This constitutes a relapse into the former, and vainly transcended, determination. The new limit itself, however, exists only to be cancelled or transcended. Thus, once more the void or Nothing has arisen, in which we once more find the above-mentioned determinateness, or new limit, and so on to infinity.

This is the Reciprocal Determination of Finite and Infinite: the finite is finite only with reference to Ought, or the infinite, and the infinite is infinite only with reference to the finite. They are inseparable and, at the same time, absolutely, in the relation of Other to each other: each has its Other in itself; thus each is the unity of itself and its Other, and in its determinateness is a Determinate Being which is not that which it, and its Other, is.

This Reciprocal Determination, negating both itself and its negation, appears as that progress to infinity which, in so many forms and applications, is taken as something ultimate beyond which no progress is possible: having reached this “and so on to infinity,” the train of thought generally is at an end.—This progress takes place everywhere where relative determinations are forced into opposition, so that, while they are in indissoluble unity, each yet has independent existence as opposed to the other ascribed to it. Hence this progress is contradiction which is not resolved, but asserted to be still at hand.

We have here an abstract progress which remains incomplete because there is no progress beyond this progress itself. The infinite is indeed at hand, and we progress beyond it; for a new limit is posited: but this very act constitutes a return to the finite. In itself, this bad infinity is the same as perpetual Ought, it is negation of the finite, but cannot truly rid itself of finitude. The latter reappears within it as its Other, since the infinite exists only in relation to its Other, the finite. The progress to infinity is therefore only a recurring monotony, one and the same wearisome alternation of this finite and infinite.

The infinity of the infinite progress remains infected with the finite as such; it is limited by the finite, is finite itself. Thus it would indeed be posited as the unity of finite and infinite. This unity, however, is not kept in mind, though it is it alone which calls up the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite,—a mainspring, so to speak, of the infinite progress. This progress is the external aspect of this unity which is the ne plus ultra of imagination,—this perpetual repetition of one and the same alternation, the empty restlessness of a progress beyond the limit to infinity, which, finding a new limit in this infinite, can find a hold in the limit no more than in infinity. This infinite has the fixed determination of a b which cannot be reached because it ought not to be reached, because the determinateness of the beyond, the existent negation, is never surrendered. According to this determination the finite remains opposed to it as a hither”, and this likewise cannot rise into the infinite because it is determined as an Other, that is, as a Determinate Being, perpetual, and still reproducing itself in its beyond in the shape of something different from this beyond.

We have demonstrated the alternating and reciprocal determination of finite and infinite: the truth of these terms here is already established, and all that is necessary is to seize this established truth. This alternation constitutes the external realization of the concept: in it the contents of the concept are posited, though in an external and non-coherent manner. For it is only necessary to compare the different moments for that unity to manifest itself, which in turn yields the concept;—this unity of finite and infinite (as has often been remarked, but must especially be remembered here) being the distorted expression for the unity as it in truth is; however, the exposition of the concept now before us must also contain the removal of this distorted determination.

Taken according to its first and merely immediate determination, the infinite is just a going beyond the finite; its determination makes it the negation of the finite; the finite, therefore, taken only as that which must be gone beyond, is in itself that self-negation which is infinity. Each, therefore, implies the determinateness of the other of the pair, which, according to the implication of the infinite progress, should exclude each other and follow alternately; neither can be posited or comprehended! without the other, neither infinite without finite nor finite without infinite. When we put in words what the infinite is (namely, the negation of the finite), the finite itself is the word we pronounce; we cannot do without it in order to determine the infinite. We need only know what we are saying, in order to find the determination of the finite in the infinite. As regards the finite, it is immediately admitted on its side that it is null; but its nullity, precisely, is infinity, from which it is equally inseparable.—It might appear that in this view they are taken according to their relation to their Other. If, accordingly, they are taken as unrelated, so that they are connected solely by the “and,” they are opposed to each other as independent, because each has its being entirely in itself. It remains to be seen what their nature is in this view. Thus placed, the infinite is only one of the two; but, as only one of the two, it is itself finite, it is not the whole but only one side; it has its limit in that which is opposed to it; it is thus the finite infinite. There are given only two finites. It is just the fact of the infinite’s separation from the finite, and consequent one-sidedness, that constitutes its finitude, that is, its unity with the finite.—On the other hand the finite, when separated from the infinite, is that self-relation which excludes its relativity, dependence, and transitoriness; it is that independence and self-affirmation which the infinite is supposed to be.

These two ways of regarding the matter appear at first to have a different determinateness for their point of departure, inasmuch as the former must consider them purely as the relation of infinite and finite, of each to its Other, and the latter in their complete severance from each other. Both, however, give one and the same result: infinite and finite regarded in their relation to each other (a relation which was to be external to them, but really is essential, for without it neither is what it is) contain each its own Other in its own proper determination, just as much as each taken by itself and considered in itself possesses its Other in it as its own moment.

We thus have that ill-famed unity of Finite and Infinite;—that unity which is itself infinity, and comprises both itself and finitude;—infinity, therefore, in a sense different from that in which the finite is separated from and opposed to it. Since now they must still be distinguished, each in itself, as has been shown, is the unity of both; thus two such unities result. The common element, the unity of each determinateness with the other, first posits these (when taken as unity) as negated, since each is supposed to be that which it is when the two are held distinct: in their unity they thus lose their qualitative nature.—This reflection is of importance to refute the idea which, in the unity of finite and infinite, refuses to abandon their retention in the quality, which is supposed to be theirs, of being external to one another;—an idea which therefore sees in their unity only the contradiction and not its solution through the negation of the qualitative determinateness of the two. Thus the unity of finite and infinite, simple and general at first, is adulterated.

But, further, since they must also be taken as distinct, the unity of the infinite, which each of these two moments is itself, is determined in each of them in a different manner. That which is determined as infinite yet contains finitude, which is distinct from it: in this unity, the former is the “in-itself,” the latter, only determinateness and limit; but it is a limit which is its absolute Other, its opposite; and its determination, which is Being-in-Self as such, is spoilt by the addition of a quality of this kind: it is thus an infinity made finite. Similarly, since the finite as such is only not-Being-in-Self, but in the unity also contains its opposite, it appreciates above its proper value, infinitely as one may say: it is posited as the finite made infinite.

Understanding, as before it adulterated the simple unity of infinite and finite, now likewise adulterates their twofold unity. Here again this is brought about when in one of the two unities the infinite is taken not as negated but as Being-in-Self, so that determinateness and barrier must not be applied to it; for else (it is thought) Being-in-Self is degraded and spoilt. Conversely, the finite, too, remains in its aspect of that which, though null, is not negated, so that in its connexion with the infinite it is held to be elevated to a status not its own, and therefore to be made infinite, in opposition to its determination which still persists and has not disappeared.

When understanding thus adulterates finite and infinite, holding fast their relation to one another as qualitative distinctness, and asserting that their determination is one of separateness (in fact, of absolute separateness), it can do so only by forgetting that which, for understanding, is the concept of these moments. For according to the concept, the unity of finite and infinite is not an external juxtaposition of these terms, nor an improper connexion contrary to their determination, and binding together entities separate and opposed and mutually independent and hence incompatible; on the contrary, each in itself is this unity, and is so only in transcending itself, neither excelling the other in Being-in-Self and affirmative Determinate Being. It has been demonstrated above that finitude exists only as a passing beyond itself; it thus contains infinity, which is its Other. And, similarly, infinity exists only as a passing beyond finitude; it thus essentially contains its Other, and so is in itself its own Other. The infinite does not transcend the finite as a power existing external to the latter; rather, it is the infinity of the finite to transcend itself.

This transcendence is not therefore alteration or otherness in general; it is not the transcendence of Something. The finite transcends itself in the infinite as negation of finitude; but the latter itself has for some time past been Determinate Being determined as a Not-being. Thus, what is transcended in the negation is itself negation. So, on its side infinity is determined as the negative of finitude and therefore of determinateness in general; as a vacant beyond; its self-transcendence in finitude is a return from this empty flight: it is a negation of that beyond, which in itself is a negative.

In both, therefore, we have the same negation of negation. But this is, in itself, a self-relation; it is affirmation, but affirmation in the sense of a return to itself, that is, through mediation, which is negation of negation. Mainly we must fix our attention upon these determinations; secondly, on the fact that they are also posited in the infinite progress, and on the manner in which they are so posited, namely, as not yet in their ultimate truth.

Here, then, first, both are negated—both finite and infinite; both are overpassed in the same manner: secondly, each after the other is posited as distinct and positive in itself. We thus select these two determinations for comparison; in this comparison (which is external) we compare how we have separated two modes of contemplation—on the one hand finite and infinite in their relation, on the other each taken for itself. The infinite progress, however, asserts more than this: in it is also posited the connexion of, terms which also are distinct, though at present distinct only as transition and alternation; we need only a simple reflection in order to see what is in fact contained therein.

The negation of finite and infinite which is posited in the infinite progress may, first, be taken as simple, so that the terms are separate members of a series. Beginning with the finite we pass beyond the limit, and the finite is negated. We therefore have its beyond, which is the infinite; in it, however, limit again arises, and thus we have the progress beyond the infinite. Partly, however, this double transcendence is posited as a mere external contingency, an alternation of the moments; partly it is not yet posited as one unity; each transition is a fresh start or new act, so that they fall apart.—Further, however, the infinite progress also contains the relation of these terms. First, there is the finite; next we pass beyond it, and this negative or beyond of the finite is the infinite; thirdly, we pass once more beyond this negation, and a fresh limit—which once more is a finite—arises.—This is the complete and self-terminating movement, where the end reached is that from which a start was made; that from which we began has now arisen, that is, the finite has been reconstructed; it has thus collapsed into itself, has found only itself again in its beyond.

The same happens with regard to the infinite. In the infinite, or the beyond of the limit, a new limit arises, and its fate is the same: being finite it must be negated. Thus that which we now have is that same infinite which lately disappeared in the new limit; consequently through its transcendence, through the new limit, the infinite has not been pushed further; it has neither been removed from the finite, since this is the mere transition into the infinite, nor from itself, for it has returned upon itself.

Thus, both infinite and finite are this movement which through negation returns to itself: they are in themselves only as mediation, and the affirmative of both contains the negation of both and is the negation of negation.—Taken thus they are result, and not, therefore, that which they are in the determination of their beginning;—the finite is not a Determinate Being on its side, and the infinite a Determinate Being or Being-in-Self beyond this Determinate Being, that is, beyond that which was determined as finite. Understanding recoils from the unity of finite and infinite chiefly for this reason only, that it presupposes the barrier and the finite, as well as Being-in-Self, as perpetual; it thus overlooks the negation of both which in fact is present in the infinite progress, together with the fact that they occur in it only as moments of a whole and that they manifest themselves only through their opposite, but equally and essentially through the transcendence of their opposite.

The return upon itself has been considered both as return of the finite and of the infinite to itself; the result shows a flaw which is connected with the distortion just criticized; first, finitude, and then infinity, is taken as point of departure, and it is only thus that two results arise. But it is perfectly indifferent which is taken as beginning; and this disposes in itself of the distinction which caused the double result. This is likewise implied in the line of the infinite progress which is unlimited in either sense; each moment, there, occurs equally in alternation, and it is quite contingent what point is fixed on and which of the two is taken as the beginning.—They are here distinct, but also each is but the moment of the other. And as both finite and infinite are themselves moments of the progress, they jointly are the finite: since jointly they are negated in the progress and in the result, their result, which is the negation of the finitude of both, is justly called the infinite. Thus the double meaning proper to both is their distinction. The finite has this double meaning, that first it is finite only relatively to the infinite which is opposed to it, while secondly it is simultaneously the finite and also the infinite opposed to it. And the infinite too has the double meaning that it is one of these two moments (it then is the bad infinite), and also is that infinite in which those two, itself and its Other, are only moments. As we actually find the infinite, its nature is to be the process in which it first degrades itself to the rank of one only of its determinations, having the finite opposed to it and thus itself becoming a finite, and next transcends this distinction from itself, rises to self-affirmation, and through this mediation is true infinite.

This determination of the true infinite cannot be cast into the formula (already criticized) of the unity of finite and infinite; the unity is abstract and motionless self-equality, and the moments too are as unmoved existents. But the infinite, like its two moments, essentially exists as Becoming, a Becoming which is now further determined in its moments. Its determinations are at first abstract Being and Nothing; as Change, It has for moments determinate existents—Something and Other; as Infinite, it has Finite and Infinite, which are themselves in process of becoming.

This infinite is the accomplished return upon itself. As such it is self-relation or Being; but not abstract or indeterminate Being, for it is posited as negating negation; and thus it is also Determinate Being, for it contains negation as such, and, therefore, determinateness. It exists, and exists as a Determinate Being, present and before us. It is only the bad infinite which is the beyond, because it is the negation, and nothing more, of the finite posited as real; it is thus abstract and first negation; it is determined as merely negative, and is without the affirmation implicit in Determinate Being; and if held fast as mere negative it is even supposed to be non-existent and beyond reach. But to be thus beyond reach is not its glory but its shame; which, ultimately, is based on the fact that the finite as such is held fast as existent. That which is untrue is beyond reach; and it is evident that such an infinite is the untrue.—The image of the “progress to infinity” is the straight line, the infinite still remaining at its two limits and there only where the line is not; now the line is Determinate Being, which passes on to this its contradictory, that is, into the indeterminate. But as true infinity, turned back upon itself, it has for image the circle, the line which has reached itself, closed and wholly present and having neither beginning nor end.

True Infinity thus taken, in general, as Determinate Being opposed affirmatively to abstract negation, is Reality in a higher meaning than is that infinity which before was determined as simple’, it has here received concrete content. It is not the finite which is the real, but the infinite; and thus Reality is further determined as Essence, Notion, Idea, and so forth. It is, however, superfluous to repeat these earlier and more abstract categories, such as “Reality,” when the more concrete has been reached, and to employ them for determinations more concrete than these are in themselves. A repetition, such as is made when we say that Essence or the Idea is the Real, has its reason in the fact that, to uncultivated thought, the most abstract categories, such as Being, Determinate Being, Reality, and Finitude, are the most familiar.

Here there is a more definite reason for recalling the category of reality, for the negation to which it stands in the relation of affirmative is here the negation of negation: it is thus itself opposed to this reality, which is finite Determinate Being.—Negation is thus determined as ideality; that which partakes of the ideal nature (das Ideelle) is the finite as it is found in true infinity,—as a determination or content, which though distinct does not exist independently, but only as moment. Ideality has this more concrete meaning, which is not fully expressed by negation of finite Determinate Being.—But with relation to reality and ideality the opposition of finite and infinite is taken in this manner, that the finite is taken as real and the infinite as of ideal nature; and such, indeed, and only such, the Notion is later on taken to be; whereas Determinate Being in general is taken as real. In this manner it is indeed of little avail if we reserve for the concrete determination of negation just indicated the term of “ideal in nature”: in this opposition a return is once more made to the one-sidedness of the abstract negative which is proper to the bad infinite, and we remain fixed in the affirmative Determinate Being of the finite.

Ideality may be called the Quality of Infinity; but, as it is essentially the process of Becoming, it is a Transition, like that of Becoming in Determinate Being, and it must now be indicated. As transcendence of finitude (finitude as such) and also of the infinity which is merely opposed to it and merely negative, this return to self is self-relation or Being. But since this Being contains negation it is Determinate Being, and since this negation essentially is negation of negation, or self-related negation, it is that kind of Determinate Being which is called Being-for-Self.

The infinite,—in the ordinary sense of bad infinity,—and the progress to infinity, are, like Ought, the expression of a contradiction, which pretends to be the solution and the ultimate. This infinite represents the first exaltation of sensuous imagination above the finite into Thought, the content of which, however, is Nothing, or that which is expressly posited as not-being; it is a flight from barrier, which, however, neither collects itself nor knows how to lead back the negative to the positive. This imperfect reflection has completely before it the two determinations of the true infinite—the opposition of finite and infinite, and the unity of these; but it fails to reconcile these two thoughts; either inevitably evokes the other, but in this reflection they merely alternate. An exhibition of this alternation, an infinite progress, everywhere takes place where a halt is made at the contradiction between the unity, and the opposition, of two determinations. The finite is self transcendence and includes its own negation, which is infinity,—this is the unity of both; we pass beyond the finite to the infinite as its beyond,—and this is the separation of them. But beyond the infinite there is another finite: the beyond or finite contains finitude;—once more we have the unity of both; but this finite is also a negative of the infinite, and this is the separation of the two: and so forth.—Thus in the causal relation cause and effect are inseparable; a cause which should have no effect is no cause, and also an effect having no cause is no effect. This relation therefore yields the infinite progress of cause and effect; Something is determined as cause, but being finite—and finite it is just because it is separated from the effect—it also has a cause, that is, it is itself effect; thus that which is determined as cause is also determined as effect: this is the unity of cause and effect. And now that which is determined as effect again has a cause, that is, cause must be separated from its effect, must be posited as a different Something;—but the new cause being itself effect, we have unity of cause and effect. But it also has an Other for its cause; this is the separation of the two determinations; and so on to infinity.

A more peculiar form can thus be given to the progress. It is asserted that finite and infinite are one unity: this false assertion must be rectified by its contradictory,—they are absolutely different and opposite: this assertion must again be rectified in the sense that they are inseparable, one determination being contained in the other through the assertion of their unity; and so to infinity.—It is an easy demand, made in order that the nature of the infinite may be understood, that it should be clearly grasped that it is the nature of the infinite progress, or developed infinite of Understanding, to be an alternation of the two determinations, of the unity and separation of the two moments; and that further it should be grasped that this unity and separation are themselves inseparable.

The solution of the contradiction does not lie in the recognition of the equal validity and the equal invalidity of the two assertions (—for this is only another form of the abiding contradiction), but in the ideality of both, in which, in their distinction, and as mutual negations, they are only moments. That other monotonous alternation is in fact the negation as well of their unity as of their separation. But what was indicated above is equally definitely contained in it, namely, that the finite falls beyond itself into the infinite, but also finds itself regenerated beyond it; that thus it merely collapses into itself, as does the infinite; so that the same negation of negation in the result brings about affirmation, which result thus proves itself to be its truth and original nature. In this Being, which is the ideality of the distinct elements, the contradiction has not vanished abstractly, but it is resolved and reconciled, and the thoughts are not only complete but combined. The nature of speculative thought shows its characteristic method in this example just worked out: it consists solely in seizing the opposed moments in their unity. Here each in fact shows that it contains its opposite and coincides with it: and thus the affirmative truth is this unity which moves itself within itself, the compacting of the two thoughts, their infinity,—self-relation, not immediate, but infinite.

Those who are no tiros in thought have often placed the essence of philosophy in the problem of answering the question how the infinite passes beyond itself and achieves finitude.—It is supposed that this cannot be made conceivable. The infinite, the concept of which we have reached, will further determine itself in the course of this demonstration; it will exemplify in every variety of form what was demanded, namely, how it, if that expression is desired, achieves finitude. Here we are examining this question only in its immediacy, and with respect to the meaning, above considered, which infinity is wont to have.

On the answer to this question nothing less than the existence or non-existence of philosophy is supposed to depend; and, while it is pretended that this is still in doubt, the question itself is thought to be a sort of puzzle, an invincible talisman rendering us safe and secure against the answer, and therefore against philosophy and the arrival at philosophy.—In other subjects, too, the art of putting a question demands some education; still more so in philosophical subjects, if a better answer be required than this, that the question is idle.

In such questions it is claimed as reasonable that the wording is irrelevant, and that it shall be intelligible from one or other mode of expression, what the point is. Expressions of sensuous imagination such as “passing beyond” and the like, which are used in the question, raise the suspicion that it is derived from the sphere of ordinary imagination, and that in the reply also figures current in common life, and the form of a sensuous analogy, are expected.

If, instead of the infinite, Being in general is taken, the determining of Being, the existence of negation or finitude in it, seems more easily comprehensible. Being is itself the indeterminate; but it is not immediately expressed in it that it is the opposite of the determinate. The infinite on the contrary contains this expressly; it is the not-finite. Thus the unity of finite and infinite immediately seems precluded; and therefore incomplete reflection opposes itself most stubbornly to this unity.

But it has been shown, and is immediately evident without further investigation of the determination of finite and infinite, that infinite, in the sense in which it is taken by this reflection (namely, as opposed to the finite), has in it its Other just because it is opposed to it; that, therefore, it is limited and itself finite, and is the bad infinite. Therefore, if it is asked how the infinite becomes finite, the answer is that there is no infinite which first is infinite and then must become finite or pass on to finitude, but that for itself it is already finite as much as infinite. The question assumes that the infinite is on the one side, by itself; and that the finite, having passed out of it, or from some other source, into the state of separation from it, is, though finite, yet veritably real. In this assumption one should rather say that that which is unintelligible is the separation: neither finite nor infinite of such a kind is true; and what is without truth is unintelligible. But we must just as much say that they are intelligible; if, considering them even as they appear to sensuous representation, we see that one contains the determination of the other, then to have this simple perception of their inseparability is to understand them: this inseparability is their concept.—But when it implies the independence of finite and infinite the question sets up an invalid content and implies an invalid relation of the latter. Therefore, instead of answering the question, its wrong presuppositions (that is, the question itself) must be negated. The question about the validity of finite and infinite changes the standpoint, and this change will cause to recoil upon the first question that embarrassment which it was intended to produce. This question of ours is foreign to the reflection which gave rise to the first question; for that reflection does not contain that speculative interest which, before it relates determinations, proceeds for its own sake to see whether they are valid as they are assumed. But once we have perceived the invalidity of this abstract infinite, and of the finite which is equally supposed to remain fixed by its side, this may be said about the emergence of the finite from the infinite, that the infinite passes out into finitude just because, taken as abstract unity, it has in it neither validity nor permanence; and, conversely, the finite passes into the infinite for the same reason, because it is void. Or, rather, this should be said, that the infinite has ever passed out to finitude; that, absolutely, it does not exist, by itself and without having its Other in itself, any more than does Pure Being.

This question about the transition of infinite into finite may also contain this presupposition, that in itself the infinite includes the finite, being thus in itself the unity of itself and its Other; so that the difficulty relates chiefly to the separation as repugnant to the supposed unity of the two. Here the opposition which is retained has only another form; unity and distinctness are separated and isolated from each other. But, if this unity is taken not as the abstract and indeterminate unity, but as the determinate unity of finite and infinite (as it is in the former presupposition), then it already contains the distinction of the two moments;—a distinction which thus, further, does not set them free to achieve separate independence, but keeps them, as of ideal nature, in their unity. This unity and this distinctness of finite and infinite are the same inseparability as finitude and infinity.

The proposition that the finite is of ideal nature constitutes Idealism. In philosophy idealism consists of nothing else than the recognition that the finite has no veritable being. Essentially every philosophy is an idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far it is actually carried through. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally with philosophy refuses to recognize in finitude a veritable being, or something ultimate and absolute, or non-posited, uncreated, and eternal. The opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore without meaning. A philosophy which should ascribe to finite Determinate Being, as such, veritable, ultimate, and absolute being, would not deserve the name of philosophy: the principles of old and new philosophies, such as water, matter, or atoms, are Thoughts, universals, and of ideal nature, not Things such as we find them immediately, that is, in their sensuous isolation. Such was not even that water which Thales feigned was the principle of things; for though it is empirical water, it is also the “in-itself” or essence of all other things; and these are not independent or based upon themselves, but posited in something else, namely, water; that is, of ideal nature. Above, the principle or universal was said to be of ideal nature; and the Notion, the Idea, the Spirit, still more deserve this name; whereas the individual things of sense-perception, as being of ideal nature in principle, exist in the Notion, and still more in the Spirit, as transcended. Herein attention must provisionally be drawn to the same double aspect as showed itself with the infinite, namely, that first that which is of ideal nature is the concrete and veritable; but, secondly, its moments are just as much that which is of ideal nature, that which is transcended in it; while, in fact, there is but the one concrete whole, from which the moments are inseparable.

By that which is “of ideal nature,” the form of imagination is meant primarily; and this name is given to whatever is in my imagination in general, or in the concept, in the idea, in the fancy, and so forth; so that it comes to be counted equivalent only to fancies,—imaginations which are not only distinct from the real, but are supposed in their essence to be not real. The true idealist, indeed, is the Spirit. Its content, even when it only feels and imagines, much more when it thinks or conceives, is not so-called real Determinate Being; in the simplicity of the ego such external Being is merely transcended, it is for me, or ideally within me. This subjective idealism, whether as the unconscious idealism of consciousness in general or as consciously expressed and laid down as a principle, applies only to the form of imagination, according to which a content is my own; in the systematic idealism of subjectivity this form is asserted to be the one true form, excluding the form of objectivity or reality, or of the external existence of this content. This idealism is formal, for it does not consider the content of imagination or of thought, which can thus remain entirely in its finitude both in imagination and in thought. In such an idealism nothing is lost; for the reality of such finite content, Determinate Being filled with finitude, is preserved; and also, in so far as we abstract from this, this content in itself is supposed to be irrelevant. Nor is anything gained, precisely because nothing is lost, and the ego, imagination, or Spirit remains filled with the same content of finitude. It is true that the opposition between the forms of subjectivity and objectivity is one of the finitudes; but the content as taken up into sensation, intuition, or the more abstract element of imagination or of thought, contains finitudes in abundance; and though this mode of finitude, the form of subjective and objective, is excluded, it is but one, and the others have not been removed, still less fallen away spontaneously.