III.2. Objectivity

In the First Book of Objective Logic abstract Being was shown as passing over into Determinate Being, but as passing back also into Essence. In the Second Book Essence is seen to determine itself to be Ground; thence it enters into Existence and realizes itself as Substance, but passes back again into the Notion. Now, so far, it has been shown of the Notion that it determines itself to be Objectivity. It is self-evident that the latter transition is, in its determination, that which elsewhere had a place in metaphysics as the Syllogism of the Notion—that is, the inference from the Notion of God to his existence,—or as the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God.—It is equally well known that the most sublime conception of Descartes, that the God is that whose Notion implies his Being, was degraded to the bad form of the formal syllogism, namely to the form of this proof, and finally succumbed to the “critique of reason” and to the idea that Existence cannot be extracted out of the Notion. Some points concerning this proof have been examined above. In Volume One (pp. 98 sqq.), where Being has vanished in its next opposite, Not-being, and Becoming has shown itself to be the truth of both, attention was drawn to the confusion which arises when, in some particular Determinate Being, its determinate content and not its Being is held fast; in this case, when one determinate content (for example, a hundred thalers) is compared with some other determinate content (for example, the context of my perception or the condition of my purse), and a distinction is found there, people have treated the question whether these two contents can be juxtaposed or not, as if the distinction between Being and Not-being or (worse still) between Being and the Notion were in question. Further, an examination was made there (p. 124, and Volume Two, p. 69) of the determination, which occurs in the ontological proof, of a sum-total of all realities.—But the essential object of this proof, the connexion between Notion and Existence, falls under the consideration (which has just been closed) of the Notion and of the whole progress through which it determines itself as Objectivity. As absolutely self-identical negativity the Notion is that which determines itself. It has already been observed that, in unfolding itself into the Judgment in individuality, it posits itself as real and existent. This reality, there still abstract, perfects itself in Objectivity.

It might appear that the transition of the Notion into Objectivity is something different from the transition from the Notion of God to his existence. In this case it must be observed (1) that the determinate content (God) would make no difference in the logical process, and that the ontological proof would only be an application of this logical process to that particular content; and (2) the observation must especially be recalled which was made above, that the subject obtains determinateness and content only in its predicate, and before this is for Notion-forming cognition only a name, whatever it may be for sensation, intuition, or imagination; while in the predicate realization in general begins simultaneously with determinateness.—The predicates however must be taken as themselves still implicit in the Notion, and therefore as something subjective which has not yet entered into Existence; and in so far it is true that the realization of the Notion is not completed in the Judgment. But on the other hand the bare determination of an object by means of predicates, without being the realization and objectivation of the Notion, remains so subjective that it is not even the true cognition and determination of the Notion of the object—something subjective in the sense of abstract reflection and images which have not been operated upon by Notions.—God as living God, and still more as Absolute Spirit, is recognized only in his activity. Man has been instructed early to recognize him in his works; from these alone the determinations can emerge which are called his properties and also contain his being. Thus Notion-forming cognition of his activity, that is, of himself, comprehends the Notion of God in his being, and his being in his Notion. Being by itself, and still more Determinate Being, is so poor and restricted a determination that the difficult undertaking of finding it in the Notion could probably arise only from the fact that no consideration was given to the meaning of Being and Determinate Being itself.—Being, as wholly abstract and immediate self-relation, is simply the abstract moment of the Notion; it is abstract universality, which also effects that which is demanded of Being, namely, to be outside of the Notion; for, however much universality may be moment of the Notion, it is equally its distinction or abstract Judgment, in which the Notion opposes itself to itself. The Notion (even as formal Notion) already contains Being immediately in a truer and richer form, since, as self-relating negativity, it is individuality.

The difficulty does indeed become insuperable of discovering Being in the Notion in general and in the Notion of God in particular, if it is to occur as palpably perceived in the context of external experience or in the form of sense-perception (like the hundred thalers in the state of my fortune), and not as conceived in its Notion by the spirit,—if it is to be visible essentially to the outer and not to the inner eye, and if that Being is called reality and truth which belongs to things as sensuous, temporal, and perishable.—If a philosophy in contemplating Being does not rise above the senses, then also it does not cast off merely abstract thought even in the Notion, which stands opposed to Being.

It is customary to take the Notion for something as one-sided as an abstract thought; and this custom will hesitate to acknowledge what was suggested above, namely, that the transition from the Notion of God to his being must be regarded as an application of the logical course of the objectivation of the Notion, which has just been set out. But if it is admitted (as is usually done) that the logical is the formal element and as such constitutes for cognition the form of any determinate content, then at least this relation ought to be allowed; unless indeed a halt is made at this opposition of Notion and Objectivity—the untrue Notion and an equally untrue reality being taken as ultimate.—But it was further indicated in the exposition of the pure Notion that this is the absolute and divine Notion itself, so that in truth this relation of application would not take place at all, but the logical process would in fact be the immediate demonstration of the self-determination of God as Being. But here this further remark must be made, that, if the Notion is to be represented as the Notion of God, it must be taken in that form in which it has already been admitted into the Idea. That pure Notion passes through the finite forms of Judgment and Syllogism because it is not yet posited as being in and for itself one with Objectivity, but is as yet conceived in the stage of Becoming towards it. And similarly this Objectivity is not yet the existence of God, not yet Reality which shows in the Idea. But still Objectivity is richer and higher than the Being or Existence of the ontological proof by as much as the pure Notion is richer and higher than that metaphysical void, the sum-total of all reality.—But I postpone to another occasion a closer examination of the manifold misunderstanding which was introduced by logical formalism into the ontological proof as well as into the other so-called proofs of the existence of God, and of Kant’s criticism of them; and I refrain at present from reconstructing their true significance, and thus re-establishing their fundamental ideas in their worth and dignity.

It has been recalled that already several forms of immediacy have occurred, although in various determinations. In the sphere of Being, immediacy is Being itself and Determinate Being, in the sphere of Essence, Existence and, further, Actuality and Substantiality, and in the sphere of the Notion (apart from immediacy as abstract universality) it now is Objectivity.—Where the exactitude of philosophic conceptual distinctions is not concerned, these expressions may be used as synonymous: those other determinations have arisen from the necessity of the Notion. Being is, in general, first immediacy; and Determinate Being is the same, plus the first determinateness. Existence, plus the Thing, is the immediacy which emerges out of Ground,—out of the self-transcending mediation of the simple Reflection of Essence. Then Actuality and Substantiality are the immediacy which has emerged out of the transcended distinction between Existence (as yet unessential) as Appearance, and its essentiality. Finally Objectivity is the immediacy to which the Notion determines itself by the transcendence of its abstraction and mediation.—Philosophy has the right to select from the language of common life, which is adapted to the world of sensuous representations, such expressions as seem to approximate to the determinations of the Notion. Hence it cannot be of importance to demonstrate for any word which has been selected from the language of common life that the same Notion for which it is used in philosophy is also connected with it in common life; for common life has no Notions, but only sensuous images; and to recognize the Notion of what is else mere image, this is philosophy. It must therefore suffice if in these expressions which are used for philosophic determinations imagination has some vague idea of their distinction, as should be the case with those expressions, so that in them certain shades of the image are recognized which are more closely related to the corresponding Notion.—It will perhaps less readily be admitted that something can be without existing; but at least the is (for example) as the copula of a Judgment will hardly be confused with the expression “to exist,” nor will it be said that “these goods exist dear, suitable,” and so forth, or “money exists metal, or metallic,” instead of “these goods are dear, suitable,” and so forth, and “money is metal.” But Being and Appearing, Appearance and Actuality, and also mere Being as opposed to Actuality, are distinguished elsewhere too; and all these expressions are distinguished even more from Objectivity.—But even if they should be used as synonyms philosophy is still at liberty to make use of such linguistic superfluities for its distinctions.

Under the Apodeictic Judgment, which is the perfection of the Judgment, so that the subject there loses its determinateness as against the predicate, mention was made of the twofold significance of the Subjectivity which is due to this fact: the terms of duplication are, the Notion, and, also, externality and contingency, which otherwise stand opposed to it. Similarly a twofold significance appears for Objectivity: it stands opposed to the independent Notion, but also is that which is in and for itself. In this sense the object is opposed to that ego = ego which subjective idealism asserts to be the absolute truth; it is thus the manifold world in its immediate existence, with which Ego, or the Notion, enters into infinite conflict only to achieve, through the negation of this Other of primary self-consciousness (which in itself is nothing), the actual truth of its self-equality.—In a less determinate sense it thus means an object in general for any interest or activity of the subject.

But in the opposite sense the Objective means that which is in and for itself and is without restriction and opposite. Reasonable principles, perfect works of art, and the like, are called objective in so far as they are free and above all contingency. Reasonable theoretical or moral principles belong to the sphere of the subjective and to consciousness, but still that element of them which is in and for itself is called objective: the knowledge of truth is placed in the cognition of the object as object and without the addition of any subjective reflection; and right action is placed in the adherence to objective laws which have no subjective origin and admit no caprice and no treatment which might overthrow their necessity.

At this point of our treatment Objectivity has the meaning of the Being (which is in and for itself) of the Notion; and the Notion has transcended the mediation which is posited in its self-determination so that it has become immediate self-relation. For this reason this immediacy is itself immediate and is wholly saturated with the Notion; and also its totality is immediately identical with its Being. But further the Notion must equally effect the free Being-for-Self of its subjectivity; so that it comes to be related to Objectivity as an End, where the immediacy of the latter becomes negative as against the Notion and becomes the object of its determining activity; it thus obtains the other meaning, that of being null in and for itself in so far as it stands opposed to the Notion.

First, then, Objectivity in its immediacy is Mechanism. In this immediacy its moments persist external and independently indifferent to one another, as Objects, by reason of the totality of all the moments; in their relation they have the subjective unity of the Notion only as inner or as outer.

But, secondly, this unity proves to be the immanent law of the Objects themselves; their relation thus becomes their peculiar difference, founded upon their law. In this relation their determinate independence transcends itself. This is Chemism.

Thirdly, however, this essential unity of the Objects is hereby posited as distinct from their independence; it is the subjective Notion, posited however as related to Objectivity in and for itself, as End. This is Teleology.

The End is the Notion posited as related to Objectivity in itself and as transcending its deficiency (which is, to be subjective) through itself; thus the adequacy to an End, which was at first external, becomes internal through the realization of the End; it becomes the Idea.