Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
Kant’s short foundation of ethics. Nothing is good without qualification except a good will, and an action has moral worth only when done from duty, out of respect for the moral law. That law is a categorical imperative, which commands unconditionally: act only on a maxim you can will as a universal law; treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means. Its ground is the autonomy of a rational will, and freedom is the presupposition that makes it possible.
- Edition
- Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott as “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals” (first published 1873), in _Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics_ (London: Longmans, Green, 4th ed., 1889). Project Gutenberg’s text (#5682), corrected word by word against two scans of the 1889 printing, with its italics. The page numbers of Rosenkranz’s edition, which Abbott gives in the text, are omitted, and of Abbott’s own notes only the explanatory ones are kept.
- Source
- Project Gutenberg
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Contents
- Preface 15 min 9
Kant divides philosophy into logic, physics and ethics, and each material science into an empirical and a pure part. Ethics needs a pure part, a metaphysic of morals cleared of everything empirical, because a moral law must hold with absolute necessity for every rational being, and an action is morally good only if done for the sake of the law. Wolff’s general practical philosophy does not supply this. The present book seeks only the supreme principle of morality, moving analytically from common moral knowledge to its principle and then synthetically back, in three sections.
- I Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical 32 min 14
Nothing is good without qualification except a good will, which keeps its worth even if it achieves nothing. Nature gave us reason not to secure happiness but to produce such a will. Through the examples of the honest shopkeeper, the man who preserves his life, and the philanthropist, Kant shows that an action has moral worth only when done from duty, not from inclination; its worth lies in its maxim, not its results; and duty is the necessity of acting from respect for law. The principle common reason already uses is: act only on a maxim you could will as a universal law.
- II Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysic of Morals 1 h 36 min 35
Morality cannot be drawn from examples or from human nature, only from pure practical reason. Imperatives are hypothetical (skill, prudence) or categorical, and only the categorical imperative is a law: act only on a maxim you can will to become a universal law. Four examples (suicide, a false promise, neglected talents, refused help) test it. It is reformulated as treating humanity always as an end, never merely as a means, and as the autonomy of a will legislating for a kingdom of ends, where persons have dignity rather than price. All other moral principles are heteronomous.
- III Transition from the Metaphysic of Morals to the Critique of Pure Practical Reason 45 min 14
Freedom, negatively independence from outside causes, is positively autonomy, so a free will and a will under moral laws are the same. Every rational being must act under the idea of freedom. To escape an apparent circle, Kant distinguishes two standpoints: as appearances we belong to the world of sense and natural law, as intelligences to an intelligible world. The categorical “ought” arises because we belong to both. How pure reason can be practical, or freedom possible, cannot be explained; we comprehend only the incomprehensibility of the moral imperative.