The Philosophy of Right

Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts

G. W. F. Hegel, 1821

Hegel’s Berlin textbook of 1821, also known as the Elements of the Philosophy of Right: freedom realised in stages, from abstract right (property, contract, wrong) through morality (intention, conscience, the good) to ethical life, where the family, civil (“civic”) society, with its system of needs, courts, police and corporations, and finally the state reconcile individual freedom with the universal. The rational is real and the real rational; the owl of Minerva flies at dusk. The book Marx set out to criticise in 1843.

Edition
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated by S. W. Dyde (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896), with Hegel’s remarks (“Notes”) and the additions of Gans’s 1833 edition; text voted from three Internet Archive copies of the 1896 printing, with Dyde’s errata applied
Source
Internet Archive

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Contents

  1. Translator’s Preface 10 min 4

    Dyde introduces his 1896 translation by summarising the preface of Eduard Gans, who edited the book in 1833. Gans praised three things: Hegel’s thoroughness, his reunion of law and politics as phases of one whole, and his placing of natural right within a developing system. Dyde adds that the work is one stage of the system set out in the Encyclopaedia, not an application of the logic, and warns readers not to dismiss Hegel’s views on the family, monarchy or war on a feeling. He explains the three layers of the text: paragraphs, Hegel’s notes, and the students’ additions.

  2. Author’s Preface 32 min 12

    Hegel’s preface of June 1820, written under the Carlsbad Decrees, presents the book as a lecture compendium built on his speculative logic. He attacks Fries and the student nationalists for founding the state on feeling, friendship and enthusiasm, finds their mark in a hatred of law, and welcomes the government’s attention to such teaching. Philosophy, he argues, does not design a state as it ought to be but comprehends the reason in what exists: what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational. Each philosophy is its own time grasped in thought; the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk.

  3. Introduction: Conception of the Philosophy of Right 1 h 42 min 14

    Hegel defines the subject of the book as the idea of right, which is freedom realised in a world of institutions. He separates philosophical from positive and historical treatments of law, praising Montesquieu but attacking the historical jurist Hugo. He then analyses the will: the negative freedom of abstraction, which in politics becomes the fury of destruction; the will that chooses a particular content; and the free will that wills freedom itself. Choice (caprice) is only formal freedom. Right is every embodiment of free will, and the book divides into abstract right, morality and ethical life (family, civil society and state).

  4. Part I Abstract Right 2 h 24 min 32

    Part One treats the freedom of the abstract person. Property is the first embodiment of free will, not merely a means to needs; it must be private, and equality means only that everyone may own. Hegel analyses taking possession, use, value and alienation, rejects slavery and the sale of one’s whole life or labour time, and discusses copyright and suicide. Contract unites two wills over an external thing, so neither marriage nor the state can rest on contract. Wrong appears as unintentional wrong, fraud and crime. Punishment, unlike revenge, cancels crime as the negation of a negation and honours the criminal as rational, leading to morality.

  5. Part II Morality 1 h 55 min 25

    Part II, “Morality” (§§ 105–141), follows the will as it turns inward and becomes a subject who judges acts by their inner side. Hegel moves through purpose and responsibility (the “right of knowledge”), intention and well-being (including the right of necessity), and the good and conscience. He praises Kant for grounding duty in the will's autonomy but argues that “duty for duty's sake” is empty formalism. The long Remark to § 140 attacks the ethics of conviction, probabilism, hypocrisy and Romantic irony, aimed at Fries and the student movement. Abstract good and abstract conscience both prove empty and pass into ethical life.

  6. Part III The Ethical System 22 min 5

    The opening of Part III (§§ 142–157) defines ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as freedom realised in a world of laws, customs and institutions that individuals recognise as their own. Duties within this order are not limits but liberation from impulse and empty choice; virtue becomes integrity and custom a “second nature”. Rights and duties coincide. Hegel rejects the “atomistic” method of building society from individuals and divides ethical life into three moments: the family, civil society and the state.

  7. III.1 The Family 49 min 11

    The family (§§ 158–181) is ethical life in the form of feeling, love. Hegel defines marriage as “legal ethical love”, rejecting views of it as a sexual relation, a Kantian contract, or love alone. Marriage is monogamous, ideally indissoluble, and completed by public ceremony; the sexes are assigned separate spheres, the man the state and science, the woman the family. The section covers family property under the husband, the education of children, divorce, and inheritance, where Hegel attacks Roman paternal power and testamentary freedom. The family dissolves into many families, which gives rise to civil society.

  8. III.2 The Civic Community 2 h 7 min 26

    Civil society (§§ 182–256), Dyde's “civic community”, is the sphere where private persons pursue their own ends and depend on one another through labour and exchange. Hegel draws on Smith, Say and Ricardo for the “system of wants”: the multiplication of needs, the division of labour, wealth and the estates. He then treats the administration of justice (codified, public law, courts, juries) and “police and corporation”. He acknowledges that civil society generates great wealth alongside a “rabble” of the poor that it cannot absorb, which drives it to foreign markets and colonies. The corporation gives members security and honour and leads over into the state.

  9. III.3 The State: Internal Polity 1 h 10 min 22

    Hegel defines the state as the actuality of the ethical idea (§ 257) and an end in itself, not a device for protecting property, which he says confuses it with civil society (§ 258). He credits Rousseau with making will the principle of the state but blames his merely common will for the Terror, and attacks Haller’s doctrine of power. The modern state draws its strength from letting particular interests develop fully while binding them to the universal (§ 260). Patriotism is everyday trust in institutions. A long Remark to § 270 separates state and religion, welcomes the division of the church, and claims freedom of science for the state.

  10. III.3 The State: The Internal Constitution 2 h 8 min 24

    Hegel rejects the separation of powers as a system of mutual mistrust and divides the state into crown, executive and legislature, each containing the others: constitutional monarchy. The monarch, hereditary by birth, supplies only the final “I will”; ministers bear responsibility. A trained civil service, the “universal class”, administers civil society, checked by corporations. The Estates assembly has two chambers, the entailed landed nobility and deputies sent by corporations, not individual voters. Its debates are public. Public opinion, mixing substantial truth and endless error, deserves to be both respected and despised; press freedom does not cover libel or incitement.

  11. III.3 The State: External Sovereignty, International Law, World-History 51 min 16

    Turning outward, Hegel argues that a state’s sovereignty shows itself in its relations with other states and in war, which is not an absolute evil but exposes the finitude of property and life. Defence belongs to a standing army whose virtue is bravery, and foreign affairs to the crown. Between sovereign states there is no judge; international law remains an “ought”, Kant’s league of peace depends on contingent wills, and disputes end in war. The only court over states is world history, which unfolds through four realms, Oriental, Greek, Roman and Germanic, culminating in the modern state as the reconciliation of reason and reality.